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ABSTRACT

Development of Software-only-Simulation Test Beds (SoST) for
Spacecraft and SmallSats
Scott Alan Zemerick

Software-only-Simulation Test Beds (SoST) are beginning to become more popular
among aircraft, spacecraft, and smallsat embedded system developers due to the high
cost of duplicating hardware test beds. Traditionally, large Department of Defense and
NASA projects duplicate rooms of expensive “one-of-a-kind” Engineering Test Units
(ETUs) for unit testing and integration testing prior to operational deployment. The
problems with this approach are many; most notably, hardware is limited, which creates
a “scarce resource” problem that causes testing, specifically software (integration) testing,
to suffer.
SoSTs provide a software-only, or virtual test bed, that creates a “digital twin” that
contains software models of the ETUs and often includes modeled components such as
flight computers, busses (e.g., MIL-STD-1553, SPI, I2C), compact PCI (cPCI) backplane
cards, sensors, and actuators. The ultimate goal of a SoST is for it to run the native
system software compiled-binary on its native CPU architecture (e.g., PowerPC,
LEON3/4, ARM) on a standard X86 personal computer/laptop without needing to
recompile for X86. This methodology maintains the “Test-As-You-Fly” approach and is a
powerful capability when used in tandem with hardware ETU test beds.
SoST integration into large projects is beginning to increase, with benefits being
immediately realized. When implemented correctly, both technically and managerially,
SoSTs can help solve the hardware “scarce resource” problem by providing a nearly
unlimited test resource that can be utilized for earlier software unit testing, integration
testing, and operator training, which results in schedule relief and improved quality and
mission assurance. However, the processes for scoping, designing, implementing, and
deploying SoSTs are immature and unknown to engineers and their management, which
can often lead to misconceptions, confusion, and project failure.
This dissertation focuses on developing the first SoST process guide using several past
spacecraft missions and smallsat missions as examples. Also, West Virginia’s first
spacecraft, Simulation-To-Flight-1 (STF-1), and its accompanying SoST, among other
missions, will be utilized as case-studies and will cover the modeling of flight computers,
avionics, dynamic simulators, and ground system components. This research includes
technical engineering detail as well as new approaches to modeling specific hardware
components. Analysis and conclusions are provided based upon measurable results.
Benefits of SoSTs will be shared along with specific examples of increased spacecraft
mission assurance.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
In 1993, the NASA IV&V Facility in Fairmont, West Virginia, was established due to the
National Research Council (NRC) recommendations following the Presidential
Commission's Report on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident [1]. The IV&V Program
specializes in performing flight software* verification and validation (V&V) to increase the
mission assurance of NASA’s highest-profile missions, such as the James Webb Space
Telescope (JWST), Space-Launch-System (SLS), and the Nancy Grace Roman Space
Telescope (RST). Software for high profile missions is often considered safety-critical,
which is a classification given for systems that could cause 1) loss of life, 2) loss of
mission, or 3) harm to the environment if a software error would occur.
The IV&V Facility is managed by NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) but is
independently funded by NASA’s Office of Safety and Mission Assurance (OSMA). In
2019, the IV&V Facility was dedicated and renamed to the Katherine Johnson IV&V
Facility. During this renaming ceremony, this author was awarded the 2019 NASA IV&V
Engineer of the Year Award, which was presented by the NASA Agency Administrator,
Mr. Jim Bridenstine, in Fairmont, WV.
The IV&V Program employs a Follow-The-Risk (FTR) [2] approach that states that flight
software's riskiest aspects are given the most V&V attention and analysis. FTR is the
process by which the IV&V Program understands, identifies, and prioritizes risk areas so
that priorities can be assigned. IV&V services are treated as a scarce resource [3], and
their activities need to be managed effectively such that the critical mission assurance
activities can be applied to the riskiest aspects of missions. For each mission that the
IV&V Program supports, it asks three questions [4] that ultimately drive its V&V approach
of NASA’s critical flight software:

*

Flight software refers to the software that operates on-orbit, e.g., onboard spacecraft or launch vehicles and is responsible for
their mission operations and safety. Generally, flight software does NOT include ground software that assists with ground
procedures and/or launch operations, although critical ground software sometimes falls within IV&V scope.
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1. Is the system doing what it is supposed to do?
2. Is it NOT doing what it is NOT supposed to do?
3. Is the system going to behave appropriately under adverse conditions?
FTR and Software Risks Analysis are relatively new techniques for NASA and flight
software V&V [5]. However, the IV&V Program has pioneered this effort by focusing on
V&V activities that have been based upon software quality assurance static methods that
follow the flight software development lifecycle. Static activities such as requirements
analysis, requirements tracing, test plan review, test result review, and manual/static
source code analysis were typically performed at the appropriate flight software
development stages. These activities have one thing in common: they are considered
static because they do NOT execute the flight software in an operational or simulatedoperational environment.
In contrast, another method of V&V is to perform dynamic analysis. Dynamic Analysis is
an industry-standard definition and approach, which simply means that the flight software
is being executed in an operational environment. In recent years, there has been a push
to augment the IV&V Program’s service portfolio with a dynamic testing capability to
increase software mission assurance for safety-critical systems.

Using flight (test)

hardware to meet this capability is not practical for the IV&V Program due to the
extremely high cost and low availability of space hardware.
Circa 2009, Software-only Simulation Test Beds (SoSTs) (so named by this author) were
invented for the purpose of performing advanced V&V activities that focused on Dynamic
Testing capabilities. For a SoST to be invented and be successful, several software
technologies also needed to be invented and integrated in order to execute a mission’s
unmodified flight software binary on X86 commodity computers. For example, spacecraft
often utilize a LEON3/4 or PowerPC CPU architecture for their embedded CPU platform,
and their executable software binaries cannot natively execute on X86 computing
platforms.
Historically, Dynamic Analysis is challenging to perform due to the very specialized and
limited-quantity hardware that is needed to execute the flight software. For example, flight
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computers typically utilize a radiation-hardened (“Rad-Hard”) PowerPC or LEON3/4
processor, which is not considered a commodity. For example, BAE’s standard radiationhardened flight computer is the RAD750 [6], which has been utilized on many NASA and
Department of Defense (DoD) missions for the past ten years due to its performance and
heritage. Also, almost all of NASA’s current missions contain customized FPGAs that
define registers, DMAs, and I/O busses specific for each mission. Without these flight
computers and FPGAs physically available, the flight software will not execute and is
therefore untestable by dynamic analysis. SoSTs solve this problem by modeling the
hardware, and thus providing a realistic environment for testing the flight software.
This dissertation describes all aspects of a SoST, emphasizing its design,
implementation, analysis, and results. This work encompasses nearly nine years of effort
and has successfully led the way for functional simulation, dynamic analysis, and virtualflatsats at NASA.
Throughout this dissertation, several spacecrafts are utilized as examples of SoST
design, implementation, analysis, results, and benefits. Each spacecraft represents a
single SoST with a shared common design and implementation. Flagship spacecrafts
that are utilized include the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) spacecraft, the
James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), and Space Launch System (SLS), among
others. Also included in more detail is the Simulation-To-Flight 1 SmallSat/CubeSat. No
export-controlled nor ITAR information is shared in this dissertation. Each spacecraft
diagram in this dissertation is available publicly, and several diagrams/figures have
already gone through the NASA release process and were originally this author’s
creation.

1.2 SoST Definition and Functional Modeling of Embedded Systems
Traditionally, and still common today, embedded computer systems and their software
are tested by constructing a hardware test bed that includes the physical computer, the
physical system, and test drivers to exercise the software [7]. This method was
manageable in the past, but as embedded systems have become more complex, V&V
has become more complex and costly to implement, and commodity computing resources
have increased in capabilities, newer methods to perform more cost-effective V&V have

pg. 3

emerged. These methods involve software-only abstraction and modeling of hardware
components, which is key for SoSTs.
The modeling and simulation (M&S) systems engineering field is extremely diverse, and
more detail is provided to inform the reader of the type of modeling and simulation utilized
in SoSTs. The reader must keep in mind that SoSTs are NOT related to Model-Based
Software Engineering (MBSwE) tools [8], processes, nor models and are generally not
related to the MBSwE field. MBSwE has been written and discussed extensively in
literature with respect to V&V and follows an abstraction paradigm, whereas the systems’
software functions are modeled at a higher level than SoSTs to verify and validate system
design behavior. SoSTs are also not directly related to Unified Modeling Language (UML)
tools or techniques, but SoSTs could be used to augment UML methods. Because the
complete transformation of UML design to C source code remains an emerging field for
safety-critical systems [9], SoSTs and their functional modeling techniques discussed
here are more suited for direct V&V of embedded systems.
Also worth mentioning is SystemC [10], which is often associated with hardware modeling
and is an ANSI C++ class library definition for system and hardware designers who have
to implement models that are either hybrid between software/hardware or models that
must be integrated into other models/simulators. SystemC can be utilized for model
development in SoSTs, but it is merely an implementation method and does not represent
the entire SoST. This author’s experience is that SystemC models are often defined at a
much higher abstraction level than SoST models and thus are not usable for drop-inintegration into a SoST, because they are not capable of executing the native flight
software. Typical SoST models are written in C, Python, or Device Modeling Language
(DML) because of integration with other software, as discussed in Chapter 3. SystemC
is a model implementation choice, and its models could be integrated into a SoST the
same as other models. Also, one drawback of SystemC is that is lacks functional
coverage [11]; functional coverage is obtained in an SoST by executing ground system
tests against the flight software and measuring the code coverage per the SoST
instruction set simulator.
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In contrast with MBSwE and SystemC, SoSTs are considered a complete functional
emulation of spacecraft hardware, thus enabling a software-only simulation system for
flight software V&V where the flight binary executable can execute “believing” that is in
space on a spacecraft.
As discussed in [12], SoSTs build upon the Electrical Functional Model (EFM) and include
high-fidelity (to be discussed later) software-only models for the onboard computer and
other aspects of the spacecraft. Traditionally, hardware model stand-ins are utilized in
EFMs, but SoSTs are unique in that the entire simulator is implemented in software. Each
item shown in Figure 1 is software in a SoST. Note the complications of transitioning
from a hardware environment to an entirely software environment when considering time
synchronization.

Figure 1. Traditional Electrical Function Model (EFM)
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Figure 2. Electrical Functional Model (EFM): SoSTs Implement in Software

Functional emulation refers to the practice of only modeling the functionality that the flight
software requires of its hardware and no more. For example, if the flight software initially
only requires thirty-two MIL-STD-1553 [13] I/O registers to exist on a standard compact
Peripheral Component Interconnect (cPCI) [14] card for reading/writing, then only those
registers should be initially modeled.

Other technical aspects such as the

communications delay on the MIL-STD-1553 bus should not be initially modeled and only
considered later once the SoST timing and synchronicity are established.

More

information on these guidelines for iterative development and model fidelity is found in
Chapter 5.
SoSTs model the hardware in software to a fidelity such that that the unmodified flight
software binaries will execute unaware that their host environment is software-only. This
dynamic simulation gives both IV&V analysts and mission systems a flight software test
environment that is functionally equivalent to the spacecraft. A key advantage to SoSTs
is that they can be shared an unlimited number of times across the Internet, enabling
more users who are not bound by location nor limited hardware resources.
SoSTs have enabled the IV&V Program to perform more advanced V&V. IV&V analysis
teams can gain an increased understanding of the software execution and behaviors,
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exercise the system under adverse conditions, and inject hardware faults into the system
to gain insight into how the software responds to adverse conditions.

1.3 Problem Statements and Motivations
The following problem statements and motivations are presented to more explicitly
describe the problems that SoST systems-as-a-whole solve.

These problems were

considered normal operations and represented the status quo prior to SoSTs being
invented. These problem statements also serve as a description of spacecraft V&V test
methods before SoSTs and are further described in Chapter 2.
A lack of a SoST for a spacecraft mission will exacerbate these issues and raise the
mission risk, specifically regarding its flight software assurance and testing. Each issue
is described in more detail with an explanation of its impact on spacecraft mission
assurance and mission success.
As an example, to help set the stage of this dissertation, a list of actual risks is presented
in Table 1 from a recent high-profile mission. Note that these risks are discussed in the
SoST motivations; SoSTs directly benefit missions’ assurance by helping to mitigate
these risks:
Table 1. Actual Risks from a High-Profile Mission

1.0

Risk
Risk of Insufficient Hardware Test Bed Shifts

Description
Insufficient personnel and unable to fully
maintain 24/7 testing.

2.0

Overutilization of Hardware Test Bed

When 24/7 operations are possible, the hardware
test bed becomes overutilized, not including the
setup and initialization time required for each
shift.

3.0

Limited Hardware Availability

A limited number of test beds, and a limited
number of engineering test units to execute flight
software.

4.0

Lack of Hardware Interface Simulator/Emulator

No simulator for development and unit testing.
All testing has to be performed on the hardware
test bed.
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1.3.1 Problem Statement #1: Limited Hardware Test Bed Resources Due to Custom Hardware
Results in a Lack of V&V
Missions rely on engineering test units (ETU) that are hardware devices that either
emulate the flight hardware or are prototype hardware units with similar functionality as
to their flight version counterparts. This hardware is utilized for software testing but is
often in limited quantities, and the Hardware Test Beds are often overscheduled and overutilized.
Spacecraft do not utilize off-the-shelf components; for the large spacecraft missions,
custom hardware solutions are engineered in extremely low quantities. This results in
limited hardware test beds, limited test opportunities, and limited testing in general.
SoST’s primary purpose was to develop software-only simulators that could help augment
traditional spacecraft flight software testing.
FlatSats, synonymous with hardware test beds, is a definition given to the physical
connection of spacecraft components, both flight, and non-flight units, in a testing area,
not integrated and physically spread out on a flat surface area. “A FlatSat is an
engineering unit of the spacecraft or SmallSat that includes all of the components, except
the structure. Typically, the components are mounted on some sort of flat board, hence
the term FlatSat. Developers can use the FlatSat to test and troubleshoot the CubeSat’s
systems without integrating everything onto the structure.” [15]
FlatSats are types of hardware-in-the-loop test beds where the flight software, hardware
integration, and input/output interfaces are tested before spacecraft assembly. FlatSats
strive to be as close to the actual flight spacecraft hardware and software configuration
as possible to ensure an accurate and reliable test bed. FlatSats are in limited quantity
and suffer from overutilization, scheduling conflicts, and downtime.
1.3.2 Problem Statement #2: Limited Fault Injection Capabilities for Thorough Flight Software
Testing
Hardware Test Beds are precious assets and cannot fulfill the role of fault injection testing
because they 1) do not support fault injection testing capabilities, and 2) cannot be
failed/broken due to them being a precious commodity. For example, on one mission,
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engineers had to result to flight software source code inspection to verify requirements
because the flight hardware under test could not be failed. There was no way to actually
test the requirements to ensure that they were implemented correctly.
1.3.3 Problem Statement #3: Limited / Nonexistent Flight Software V&V Methods for SmallSats
and CubeSats
The last ten years have witnessed the revolution and exponential growth of SmallSats /
CubeSats in the commercial and government sectors. However, according to the 2019
NASA Ames Research Center study titled, Small-Satellite Mission Failure Rates [16]
“…41.3% of all small satellites launched experienced total or partial mission failure. Of
these, 6.1% were launch vehicle failures, 11% were partial mission failures, and 24.2%
were total mission failures.” Also, as noted in this report, “Another reason [for the failures]
could be that as the small satellite software complexity has increased, the methods used
to perform verification and validation of the small satellite software has not increased
commensurately.”
According to [17], SmallSat Soft Faults, also known as software bugs, transients, or
electromagnetic interference, are caused by inherent software issues, cosmic ray
intensity, or impending hardware failure. Soft Faults can significantly contribute to a
SmallSat’s decreased on-orbit operations, partial mission failure, or complete mission
loss. For example, the Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC) Dellingr SmallSat [18] had
a near-mission ending uncontrolled rapid spin-rate that occurred due to a software fault.
Further discussing the lack of SmallSat testing, [19] surveyed approximately two-hundred
(200) SmallSat organizations and found that “adequate software testing is a concern
everywhere.” Organizations (both industry and academia) focus on hardware-based
flatsats for their systems and integration testing, but there was no software-only
simulation usage as virtual-flatsats, because (presumably), organizations did not have
the expertise nor funding to implement.
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1.3.4 Problem Statement #4: COVID-19 Situation Limits Hardware Testing Causing Schedule
Delays
During the current COVID-19 quarantine and situation, hardware test beds have been offlimits for NASA personnel per this author’s first-hand information and are just now (after
six months) starting to operate at significantly reduced capacity. COVID-19 is delaying
spacecraft hardware development, test and integration, and flight software development
and test schedules.
1.3.5 Problem Statement #5: Limited Testing Venues of Embedded Non-X86 Flight Software
Spacecraft flight computers are expensive and in short supply due to their low
manufactured quantities and specialized parts. In an ideal world, each flight software
developer and tester would each have their own flight computer to perform development
and testing. This is not realistic and is further exacerbated by additional custom hardware
that needs to be included for the flight software to boot to an operational state
successfully. This results in only one to two testing venues that are capable of executing
the flight binary in a test-as-you-fly configuration.
1.3.6 Probably Statement #6: Lack of Virtualization Technologies
Virtualization technologies were slow to be adopted in the government, with computing
systems being installed and operated as a single host computer, with no virtualization, no
guest operating systems, and no cloning or migration capabilities. An ancillary benefit to
SoSTs is the utilization of virtualization to generate ready-to-run test environments on the
fly. Virtualization is also the first step to enabling industry-standard practices such as
Continuous Integration (CI) and Continuous Testing (CT) [20].
1.3.7 Problem Statement #7: Flight Hardware Driver and Software Interfaces are Tightly
Coupled
Traditionally, the hardware’s software driver and software interface layers are tightly
coupled and not meant to be “separated.” This causes inflexible software that only
executes on the very specific and custom flight hardware, thus exacerbating the limited
hardware test bed issue. In the past, the software would only be intended to be executed
on the specific hardware, not commodity X86 computing platforms.
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1.4 Requirements of a Software-only Simulation Test Bed (SoST) to Address Problem
Statements
1.4.1 Dissertation and Technical Approach
This dissertation’s technical approach describes the SoST invention, design,
implementation, and roadmap.

The entire dissertation and the SoST invention are

designed to address the Problem Statements in various ways, usually in a holistic
manner. When implemented, SoSTs are considered a complete system; it is challenging
to show individual components' benefits without considering the entire integrated SoST.
In fact, integration of the various components is one unique feature of SoSTs, and often
the most challenging part of the process, requiring other integrated technologies.
The SoST modeling processes can be applied to multiple missions, with the resulting
product being a specific SoST containing models of a single spacecraft’s hardware.
1.4.2 Main Technical Objective
The main technical objective is to execute the flight binary executable on commodity X86
computing hardware, thus providing an inexpensive platform for performing flight software
V&V and fault injection testing.
1.4.3 Level-0 Requirements and Goals
The Level-0 initial requirements for a SoST are listed below, along with a description and
their rationale. Level-0 represents the high-level requirements that drive the design and
implementation and are derived from the aforementioned Problem Statements.
These requirements are assumed to be SHALL statements and begin with the prefix “The
SoST SHALL…”. The requirements’ text has been shortened for readability.
Table 2. SoST Requirements

1.0

2.0

SHALL Requirements
…Include CPU Instruction Cycle
Accuracy

Description and Rationale
Provides as close as possible results to hardware test beds

…Support the Execution of the Flight
Binary

Maintains the Test-As-You-Fly Mantra
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SHALL Requirements
…Support a Ready-To-Run,
Distributable Virtual Environment

Description and Rationale
Quickly created and shared environment to lower the activation
energy of use, allowing more time for testing and development.

4.0

…Provide Synchronous System with
the ability to Pause, Stop, or Resume
Execution

The ability to pause, stop, or resume execution is very powerful for
debugging and testing and is a capability that is not present in
hardware test beds

5.0

…Include Fault Injection Capabilities

The ability to inject faults and fail emulated hardware is critical for
flight software V&V edge testing.

6.0

…Utilize the mission’s ground
software system as the main
Graphical User Interface (GUI)

The mission’s operational ground software system serves as the
primary user interface because it supports 1) spacecraft
commanding, 2) spacecraft telemetry and 3) scripting of spacecraft
commands. Also, using the operational ground software system
provides significant familiarity to the SoST users, as they already are
experienced with the software.

7.0

…Be a Software-only Simulation with
no hardware-in-the-loop

SoSTs abstract the hardware interface away and replace it with a
software-only interface that is synchronous.

8.0

…Be scalable for both large
spacecraft missions and for
SmallSats / CubeSats

SoSTs originally were applied to large NASA missions, but the
explosion in popularity of SmallSats / CubeSats and their lowreliability rates required additional V&V and risk reduction
methodologies to be applied in cost-constrained environments.

9.0

…support analysis and verification of
models and benefits

SoSTs need to be verified themselves, with measurable results and
metrics in order to provide unquestioning assurance and findings.

3.0
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1.4.4 Dissertation Organization to Address Problem Statements
This dissertation follows the standard outline, whereas:
•

Chapter 1, this chapter presents the topic, problem statements, and dissertation
organization.

•

Chapter 2 describes the Background, Literature Review, and History. This chapter
provides context for the status quo before when SoSTs were invented.

•

Chapter 3 describes the Design of a Software-only Simulation Test Bed (SoST) for
Flagship Spacecraft Missions. This section covers topics such as flight computer
modeling, synchronous compact PCI (cPCI) modeling and operations, functional
modeling of registers, memory banks, and DMA, and synchronous modeling of
input/output (I/O) interfaces. Specific spacecraft examples will be used as design
references and examples.

•

Chapter 4 describes the specific application of SoSTs to SmallSats/Cubesats,
including design, implementation abstraction, and utilization on the STF-1
CubeSat.

•

Chapter 5 presents an Engineering Roadmap that provides a unique process for
scoping, designing, and implementing a SoST.

•

Chapter 6 discusses the analysis, verification, and results of SoST systems and
models. Realized benefits are also discussed.

•

Chapter 7 presents the conclusion/contributions and describes future work areas
for SoSTs.

Table 3 outlines the Problem Statements' mappings to Requirements, and then where
the Requirements are addressed in the dissertation. This mapping shows how each
Problem Statement relates to the aspect of a SoST system. The dissertation's body
provides technical details as to the design, implementation, analysis, and results of
SoSTs.
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Table 3. Mapping of Problem Statements, Requirements, and Dissertation (Contd. on Pgs. 14-15)

1.3.1

Problem
Statement
Limited Hardware
Test Bed
Resources Due to
Custom Hardware
Results in a Lack
of V&V

SoST Level-0
Requirement(s)
2.0 Support the
Execution of the Flight
Binary

Addressed in Dissertation
3.3.2. Unmodified Flight Software Binary
3.3.4. Spacecraft Segment: Modeled Spacecraft Hardware
– Command and Data Handling (C&DH)
3.4.1. Flight Computer and Component Modeling

3.0. Ready-To-Run,
Distributable Virtual
Environment

3.5
3.5.1
4.3.5

Deployment and Usage
Ready-To-Run Virtualization Implementation
Ready-To-Run Deployment and Operations

7.0. Software-only
Simulation with no
hardware-in-the-loop

3.3.5
Spacecraft Segment Integration: NASA
Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine Middleware
3.4.2. Advanced SoST Modeling Techniques
3.4.3. MIL-STD-1553: Synchronous Modeling of Input /
Output (I/O) Interfaces

1.3.2

1.3.3

Limited Fault
Injection
Capabilities for
Thorough Flight
Software Testing

Limited /
Nonexistent Flight
Software V&V
Methods for

4.0 Provide
Synchronous System
with the ability to
Pause, Stop, or Resume
Execution

3.3.5
Spacecraft Segment Integration: NASA
Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine Middleware

5.0 Fault Injection
Capabilities

3.3.5
Spacecraft Segment Integration: NASA
Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine Middleware

7.0. Software-only
Simulation with no
hardware-in-the-loop

3.3.5
Spacecraft Segment Integration: NASA
Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine Middleware

8.0 Scalable for both
large spacecraft
missions and SmallSats
/ CubeSats

3.4.2. Advanced SoST Modeling Techniques
3.4.3. MIL-STD-1553: Synchronous Modeling of Input /
Output (I/O) Interfaces

3.4.2. Advanced SoST Modeling Techniques
3.4.3. MIL-STD-1553: Synchronous Modeling of Input /
Output (I/O) Interfaces
4
SoST for SmallSats and CubeSats
5
Engineering Roadmap for Scoping, Designing, and
Implementing a SoST

pg. 14

Problem
Statement
SmallSats and
CubeSats

SoST Level-0
Requirement(s)
9.0. Support analysis
and verification of
models and benefits

Addressed in Dissertation
6

Methods of SoST Verification and Analysis

6.1
Method 1: Utilization of Hardware Test
Procedures as Verification Methods
6.2
Method 2: Utilization of Hardware Checkout Tests
as Verification Methods
6.3
Method 3: SmallSat SoST Model Verification
Examples for NOS3

1.3.4

1.3.5

1.3.6

COVID-19
Situation Limits
Hardware Testing
Causing Schedule
Delays

2.0 Execution of the
Flight Software Binary

7.2
Direct Benefits: Flight Software Issues Identified
Due to SoST V&V

3.0. Ready-To-Run,
Distributable Virtual
Environment

3.3
3.5.1
4.3.5

Deployment and Usage
Ready-To-Run Virtualization Implementation
Ready-To-Run Deployment and Operations

Limited Testing
Venues of
Embedded NonX86 Flight
Software

1.0 CPU Instruction
Cycle Accuracy
2.0 Execution of the
Flight Software Binary

7.1

Problem Statement Review and Benefits Realized

3.0. Ready-To-Run,
Distributable Virtual
Environment

3.3
3.5.1
4.3.5

6.0 Utilize the mission’s
ground software
system as the main
Graphical User
Interface (GUI)

5
Engineering Roadmap for Scoping, Designing, and
Implementing a SoST

3.0. Ready-To-Run,
Distributable Virtual
Environment

3.5.1
4
4.3.5

Lack of
Virtualization
Technologies

3.3.2. Unmodified Flight Software Binary
3.3.4. Spacecraft Segment: Modeled Spacecraft Hardware
– Command and Data Handling (C&DH)
3.4.1. Flight Computer and Component Modeling
Deployment and Usage
Ready-To-Run Virtualization Implementation
Ready-To-Run Deployment and Operations

Ready-To-Run Virtualization Implementation
SoST for SmallSats and CubeSats
Ready-To-Run Deployment and Operations

6.0 Utilize the mission’s
ground software
system as the main
Graphical User
Interface (GUI)
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1.3.7

Problem
Statement
Flight Hardware
Driver and
Software
Interfaces are
Tightly Coupled.

SoST Level-0
Requirement(s)
7.0. Software-only
Simulation with no
hardware-in-the-loop

9.0. Support analysis
and verification of
models and benefits

Addressed in Dissertation
5.1
5.2
5.3
Levels
5.4

How to Begin SoST Design and Implementation
Choosing Appropriate Levels of Fidelity
Scoping Modeling Efforts Based Upon Abstraction
Hardware Modeling Best Practices

6
Methods of Functional Model / SoST Verification
and Analysis
6.1
Utilization of Hardware Checkout Tests as
Verification Methods
6.2
Utilization of Spacecraft Hardware System Tests
as Verification Methods
6.3
Method 3: SmallSat SoST Model Verification
Examples for NOS3
7

Conclusion and Benefits Realized
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2 Spacecraft Background, Literature Review, and SoST Advantages
This section describes several aspects of space systems and the status quo before the
invention of SoSTs. This background information is needed for the reader to understand
the SoST context within larger space systems. This chapter’s subsections describe the
building blocks that SoSTs are built upon.
SoSTs remain a unique invention, with their advancements in software/systems
integration, synchronous/asynchronous accurate timing, and virtualization.

2.1 Space System Segments
Spacecraft systems are divided
into three segments, and a basic
understanding

is

needed

to

understand the corresponding
SoST use-cases.

The three

segments

1)

include

Space

Segment, 2) Ground Segment,
and 3) User Segment.

These

segments are described briefly
below, along with how they relate
to SoSTs. Figure 3 shows the

Figure 3. Three Segments of Space Systems

segments; however, SoSTs
are mostly focused on spacecraft flight software; thus, the software aspect of the
segments is discussed in detail.
2.1.1 Space Segment and Flight Software Overview
The Space Segment represents the spacecraft and is the most critical segment of the
SoST. SoST engineers must understand the complete spacecraft system, its hardware
components, and its software. Furthermore, an intimate knowledge of spacecraft flight
software is needed because the unmodified flight software binary needs to execute
“inside” the SoST so that it is unaware that it is executing in a software-only environment.
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NASA spacecraft, SmallSats, and launch vehicles utilize various flight software
frameworks, with the choice dependent upon the NASA center that is leading the effort
and past flight software heritage. Within the last several years, NASA Goddard Space
Flight Center’s (GSFC) Core Flight System (cFS) [21] framework has increased in
popularity and is now utilized at the Ames Research Center (ARC), Johnson Space
Center (JSC), Goddard Space Flight Center (GSFC), and the Johns Hopkins University
Applied Physics Laboratory (APL).
“The core Flight System (cFS) is a platform and project independent reusable
software framework and set of reusable software applications. There are three key
aspects to the cFS architecture: a dynamic run-time environment, layered software,
and a component-based design. It is the combination of these key aspects that
makes it suitable for reuse on any number of NASA flight projects and/or embedded
software systems at a significant cost savings.” [22]
cFS has been released as NASA open-source software [23] and is available to anyone
wanting to utilize a C framework for developing flight (or embedded) software. cFS is a
modular publish/subscribe (“pub/sub”) architecture that supports the concept of
applications (or “apps”), which are separately and dynamically loaded modules (or
components) that contain specific mission functionality.
2.1.2 Core Flight Software (cFS) Flight Software Architecture
The cFS architecture is a
publish/subscribe message bus
implemented

by

the

cFS

Executive Services, shown in
the green box in Figure 4.
Hanging off the message bus
box are applications (or “apps”)
that are considered missionspecific

or

user-specific

applications that address and
implement

specific

mission

Figure 4. cFS "Lollipop Chart" Showing the cFS Architecture and Apps
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requirements. Out-of-the-box, cFS provides several applications that are common across
most NASA spacecraft missions. cFS is able to execute on x86 Linux computers in
addition to flight target hardware such as the Xilinx Zynq, BAE’s RAD750, and Atmel’s
AVR32 CPUs.
2.1.3 Ground Segment and Ground Software Considerations
Every spacecraft mission, including major spacecraft and smallsats, requires a Ground
Software System (sometimes referred to as Mission Operations) that is utilized for
sending commands to the spacecraft and receiving data (often called telemetry) from the
spacecraft. These commanding and telemetry functionalities are requirements for each
spacecraft. The Ground Segment is not the main focus of a SoST in this dissertation, but
it should be noted that SoSTs integrate the spacecraft mission’s ground software system
into a virtualized container. For most SoSTs, their main graphical user interface (GUI) is
the ground software system. Thus, the Ground Segment is critical to SoST usage, but it
does not represent the most challenging engineering problems with SoSTs. Specifically,
Mission Operations can significantly benefit from a high-fidelity spacecraft simulator, such
as a SoST. As discussed in [24], the SoST can be utilized to verify and validate flight
procedures earlier in the spacecraft lifecycle before actual launch and on-orbit operations.
2.1.4 User Segment
The User Segment represents the end-user of the spacecraft, which is sometimes also
the user of the SoST and responsible for the flight software verification and validation
(V&V) results. The User is most often considered the spacecraft operator and responsible
for sending commands to the spacecraft and receiving/interpreting health and
engineering telemetry from the spacecraft. During normal spacecraft operations, the User
interacts with the Ground Segment to control the spacecraft.

2.2 Literature Review and Prior Work
2.2.1 Embedded Systems, Flight Software Testing, and V&V Methods
Flight Software is a type of embedded system, and thus, V&V testing methods that apply
to embedded systems can also apply to spacecraft flight software testing and V&V. Flight
software testing involves loading the target flight software binary onto the flight computer
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and then performing a series of unit, integration, and formal acceptance tests; these tests
form the framework for the entire V&V process for an embedded system.
As noted in [25], verification is a significant challenge for embedded systems, especially
those that are categorized as safety-critical. Verification costs are estimated to consume
50-70% or more of development time, and automated verification methods suffer from
state-space explosion, thus limiting automation’s effectiveness. Software errors are still
discovered late in the development lifecycle. SoSTs, however, approach safety-critical
verification differently in that automation is utilized, but not attempted for state-space
coverage. Instead, automation can be performed by having Risk-Based Scenario Tests
execute automatically via the ground station software. This type of verification focuses
on the highest risk software areas. Also discussed in [25] is the usage of abstraction, as
it has been touted as being effective; however, in practical applicability, it is difficult to
transition from a high-abstraction model, implemented via SystemC or Transaction Level
Modeling (TLM), to the actual source code. SoSTs avoid a high degree of abstraction by
focusing on functional and behavioral modeling paradigm, that enables actual execution
of the flight software, maintaining the test-as-you-fly mantra.
As described in [26], NASA has traditionally performed a standard V&V process
composed of hardware-in-the-loop “simulation” that relies on the actual flight hardware or
flight hardware stand-ins to perform flight software testing.

The use of the term

“simulation” in this context is not similar to SoSTs. In the context as described in [26],
“simulation” is referring to a complete hardware-in-the-loop test bed setup that simulates
the actual aircraft or spacecraft, as evidenced by the quote:
“Without detailed modeling of the aircraft’s computers and systems, it is impossible to
evaluate the interaction of their embedded systems. Because timing is an important
and sometimes overriding consideration in complex systems, the use of existing flight
computers in the simulation is essential.” [26]
This method of V&V is still common today in NASA due to its effectiveness, albeit costly.
The goal of SoSTs is not to replace hardware-in-the-loop testing but rather to augment it
and be utilized for different purposes throughout the flight software development lifecycle,
thus helping to increase a mission’s assurance.
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There are many examples of NASA utilizing hardware-in-the-loop test beds (often
referred to as “FlatSats”) for performing various testing methodologies. A more recent
(public) example is the testing of the Frontier radio utilized by the Applied Physics
Laboratory (APL) Parker Solar Probe spacecraft and planned to be utilized for the Europa
Clipper spacecraft. Testing of the Frontier radio, described in [27], illustrates how the
radio flight unit was tested in a FlatSat configuration. Because no accurate CPU simulator
nor instruction set simulators were available, the team was required to utilize actual
FPGAs and a MIPS CPU to execute the radio’s flight software under test.
2.2.2 Static Software Source Code Analysis
One method of traditional V&V is to perform static source code analysis utilizing
commercial off-the-shelf tools (e.g., Klockwork) designed to analyze the software source
code and identify bugs, errors, memory leaks, and security weaknesses, all without
executing the software. These tools will perform a light-weight compilation process and
then “walk” each software branch, attempting to identify risky code areas. According to
[28], the main advantages of static analysis are that it can find weaknesses in the code
earlier in the software lifecycle, detect unreachable code, uncalled functions, and security
issues that may escape a human’s review.
Limitations of static analysis include a considerable effort to eliminate false positives and
try to review false negatives. These tools can produce thousands of results that an
engineer must manually review, which remains error-prone. More importantly, software
behavior during execution cannot be tested nor verified using only static analysis. This
is a severe limitation of static analysis and should be considered when planning and
scoping test activities. Static analysis, while necessary for its purpose, cannot answer
nor prove the three V&V questions presented in Chapter 1:
1. Is the system doing what it is supposed to do?
2. Is the system NOT doing what it is NOT supposed to do?
3. Is the system going to behave appropriately under adverse conditions?
The NASA IV&V Facility has traditionally excelled in static source code analysis and is
often utilized by NASA missions to provide an independent static analysis service. The
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IV&V Facility receives a specific flight software version from the mission center (i.e.,
GSFC, MSFC, JPL), perform static analysis utilizing several COTS tools, manually review
the results, then report the findings back to the project. When received, the project
addresses the issues, deciding upon either fixing them or, in some cases, not fixing the
issues. This process repeats for the entire IV&V lifecycle.
2.2.3 Dynamic Software Source Code Analysis
Dynamic software code analysis is a relatively new definition that is directly related to the
SoST invention. In the past, dynamic software analysis for safety-critical systems, such
as presented in [29], often meant that the system's states were dynamically determined,
and then analysis was performed to ensure that the software states were tested entirely
and analyzed. As related to SoSTs, the term dynamic refers to the execution of the
embedded flight software in typically a software-only environment. Please note that
Dynamic Analysis, when discussed with SoSTs, is referring to the test-as-you-fly
embedded flight software where the flight software is executed while being under-test.
Dynamic Analysis should always execute the exact flight software binary (with no
recompile) that will be executed on board the spacecraft.
Dynamic Analysis is usually not performed on hardware test beds, but instead is used as
a method that complements static code analysis in simulated/emulated environments,
such as SoSTs. Dynamic Analysis for SoSTs was mentioned at the Safe and Secure
Systems and Software Symposium (S5) conference in 2014 [30] with respect to verifying
software behavior. Also, the Charter of the NASA IV&V Independent Test Capability (ITC)
Team is to “acquire, develop, and manage adaptable test environments that enable the
dynamic analysis of software behaviors. Dynamic Analysis is performed on flight
software to verify software behavior” [31].
Dynamic Analysis provides several advantages to typical testing methods, whether
related to hardware test beds or static code analysis. The following table outlines known
and author-experienced advantages, along with a specific example from this author’s
experience.

Dynamic Analysis cannot replace other testing/V&V strategies, but the

assurance of the safety critical system increases significantly when used in combination.
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Table 4. Advantages and Examples of Dynamic Analysis

Dynamic Analysis Advantages
Identifies possible bugs/issues in
a flight software execution
environment.

Specific Author Experience
For one mission, specific issues were encountered with the Board
Support Package (BSP), that contained the flight computer software
drivers. The BSP is often one of the least-tested parts of the embedded
flight software.

2.0

Allows for flight software analysis
in which you do not have access
to the actual source code.

Once a SoST is mature, the source code is not needed and seldom used
unless there is an issue requiring an engineer’s review. For many
missions, the source code is never utilized in the SoST, only the
embedded flight software binary. More information on how SoSTs are
utilized is found in later chapters of this dissertation.

3.0

Permits the validation of static
code analysis findings, including
false negatives.

On several occasions, a static code analysis finding has resulted in a
more detailed analysis needing to be performed. Dynamic analysis was
utilized and targeted in order to answer the specific question and verify
the static code analysis finding.
In one specific example, an Object-Oriented initialization routine was
not evident due to C++ abstraction and inheritance, and actually
executing the code in a dynamic method was needed to definitively
verify the finding as a flight software error.

1.0

2.2.3.1

Usage of Instruction Set Simulators (ISS) in Dynamic Analysis

Instruction Set Simulators (ISS) represent a core SoST component. ISSs are software
that is capable of translating one “guest” CPU’s instruction set to the host-computer’s
native instruction set so that the guest’s software binary can execute on the host
computer. As described in [32], “an ISS generalizes various processors’ instructions, by
the means of translating various processors’ instructions into virtual instructions, which
then provides a virtual CPU” that can execute on typical X86 commodity hardware.
For example, the SoST invention has grown the use-case in space applications of
executing PowerPC instructions on a commodity X86 computer for software verification.
Each PowerPC instruction is mapped to an X86 instruction (or group of instructions), so
that as the program counter (PC) is advancing in the virtual PowerPC CPU, the PowerPC
instructions are translated to X86 instructions in its own Execution Context.

The

Execution Context is similar to virtualization of the PowerPC computer system, in that the
system components such as RAM, I/O busses, etc. are mimicked as the PowerPC
software executes, it can successfully manipulate its “memory” and “I/O” that belong to
its Execution Context.

pg. 23

Traditionally, ISSs have been standalone and utilized for educational purposes for
teaching a CPU’s specific instruction set. As shown in [33], they provide an excellent
learning environment for students to write assembly instructions in the native CPU
instruction set and execute their code on commodity X86 computers without needing
specific hardware for execution and learning. Although not common at the time, early
efforts [34] have utilized ISSs for real-time software timing analysis, as the ISS can better
estimate the virtual CPU’s cycle instruction time, thus providing a much more accurate
calculation of CPU cycle delay in hard real-time systems, whereas previously only offline
analysis was performed. This concept represents an essential building block of SoSTs,
whereas SoSTs represent a much larger and complete virtual spacecraft environment.
More recently, with the evolution of mobile computing developments, ISSs have started
to be utilized for developing mobile applications in standard software development
environments (e.g., Microsoft Visual Studio, Microsoft Visual Studio Code), thus enabling
software engineers to develop and test their software without having to deploy it to a
mobile device. These technologies have matured open-source ISSs in recent years.
The creation of specific ISSs are outside the scope of this dissertation; however, their
integration into SoSTs is a crucial step and is unique in the spacecraft market. This author
has experience with several ISSs, both open-source and commercial/proprietary.
Significant effort is needed to integrate an ISS into a complete spacecraft simulator such
that it is capable of executing the flight software. This software integration is discussed
in detail in this dissertation; PowerPC and LEON3/4 CPU architectures are common flight
computers due to their performance specifications [35], utilized in spacecraft, and are the
main ISSs discussed by this author.
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There are several ISSs available on the commercial and open-source markets. This
author has conducted market surveys to identify competing or complementary
technologies available for hardware modeling and integration into SoST, with emphasis
on PowerPC and LEON3/4 CPU architectures. The research also attempted to identify a
standard modeling language or tool that could be used across various ISS choices. It is
vital to choose the appropriate ISS for a SoST; otherwise, the software integration efforts
will most likely fail.

Characteristics of ISSs that make them appropriate for SoST

integrations are presented in Chapter 5 Engineering Roadmap for Scoping, Designing,
and Implementing a SoST.
Wind River Simics [36], [37] is
one example of a Commercial
Off the Shelf (COTS) ISS. Figure
5 describes a Wind River article
about the Global Precipitation
Management (GPM) SoST from
their perspective but references
this dissertation work. Although
Simics

provides

ecosystem

for

a

robust

computer

system model development,

Figure 5. SoST featured in Wind River Simics Book Citation.

including the availability of common hardware models and a powerful debug environment,
these tools lock the developer organization into a single vendor. Simics has advantages
in that it provides some software modeling infrastructure support out-of-the-box. For
example, Simics has the notion of a virtual cPCI bus that modeled cPCI cards are
“plugged into.”
Another popular ISS is the widely used Quick Emulator (QEMU) [35], which is a generic
and open source machine emulator and virtualizer. It includes emulation capabilities for
various platforms and architectures. QEMU is a flexible, software-only emulation platform
capable of emulating many hardware families by dynamically translating code written for
the target platform into native code. It can emulate CPUs or complete hardware platforms
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based upon those CPUs. It can also be used as a virtualization platform for certain
hardware families, running at near-native speed. QEMU has grown in popularity due to it
being open-source and flexible. QEMU supports a large number of CPU targets and
maintains a fast execution performance profile due to its dynamic recompilation
techniques [38].
When used, QEMU achieves near native performance by executing the guest code
directly on the host CPU. QEMU supports virtualization when executing under the Xen
hypervisor or using the KVM kernel module in Linux. When using KVM, QEMU can
virtualize x86, server and embedded PowerPC, and S390 guests. QEMU’s hardware
emulation and host integration are complete enough to run, such as Linux live CDs for
the SPARC and PowerPC platform, complete with networking and graphics.
When SoSTs were becoming mature (~2013 to ~2015), others were just starting to utilize
ISSs for Soft Error Injection for testing embedded software. As described in [39], QEMU
was utilized for error injection of a system that utilized the RTEMS RTOS [40], which is a
popular RTOS with the European Space Agency (ESA) and is growing in usage in the
United States. However, this work focused on error injection of CPU registers, which are
natively supported by QEMU. SoSTs offer a more complete platform for fault error
injection tests since it includes spacecraft and bus hardware models.
One disadvantage of utilizing QEMU as a SoST ISS is that although custom hardware
models can be developed, QEMU was not developed with a modeling infrastructure in
mind, so extensibility and custom modeling present a large initial effort, and a plugin style
architecture does not exist, so re-compilation is required to add peripheral models. QEMU
is written in C and is tightly coupled to its QEMU libraries, so there is no commonality with
other emulators. However, QEMU does have SystemC integration utilities if a common
hardware modeling language is desired [41]; however, this author’s experience is that
QEMU and SystemC integration remain an academic exercise at this time.
Both Simics and QEMU have been utilized in SoSTs, so they are presented in Table 5
and compared. SoSTs have been designed to be mostly ISS agnostic, with integration
implementation details for each ISS discussed in later chapters.
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Table 5: Comparison of Wind River's Simics and QEMU Instruction Set Simulators

Characteristic

Simics

QEMU

YES

YES

YES (Recently)

YES

YES

NO

Open-Source License

NO
(Commercial)

YES
(GPL V2)

Support for SystemC

YES (Limited)

YES (Limited)

Languages Supported

C, Device Modeling
Language (DML), Python

C, (Others when using
language bindings)

PowerPC CPU Support

LEON3/4 Support
Designed for Device Modeling;
Has Software Infrastructure
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2.2.4 Combining Static and Dynamic Analysis Methods
Combining Software Static Analysis with Dynamic Analysis is a new paradigm that has
been pioneered at the NASA IV&V Facility and by this author in recent years. Since
SoSTs provide an additional assurance activity to augment static analysis, it is
advantageous to combine the two efforts providing a significantly powerful tool for helping
determine software assurance and FTR. Generally, this topic is outside the scope of this
dissertation but is mentioned here to provide context into the importance of SoSTs for
providing mission assurance. Combining static and dynamic analysis techniques, which
could be a published future SoST topic, focuses on first utilizing static analysis results to
pinpoint and identify “risky” parts of the flight software that may require additional testing.
Once the “risky” parts of flight software are identified, dynamic test cases can then be
constructed to further test the flight software by utilizing the SoST. The tests can be
executed on the SoST to ensure that the flight software meets the three V&V Objective
Questions as discussed earlier. This concept was explored in [42], but SoSTs offer a
different and more holistic perspective in that after the static analysis issues are identified,
then actual spacecraft V&V tests can be (created and) executed to verify complete
spacecraft behavior, thus better assessing the impact of the issue to the entire spacecraft,
its risk, chances of occurring, and conditions of occurrence.
Figure 6 illustrates the workflow for combining static and dynamic analysis. The static
analysis is performed, reviewed by an engineer, and any software issues are identified.
Those software issues are then converted into dynamic tests to be executed within the
SoST. The output of the workflow is increased assurance that the flight software will
perform as expected.

pg. 28

Figure 6. Workflow for Combining Static and Dynamic Analysis

2.3 SoST Invention Development and Maturation
This author has anecdotal evidence from years of NASA experience and is in a unique
position to discuss NASA SoST development, use, and maturation during the past eight
years. Prior to SoST development efforts, very little of NASA systems engineering
included simulator/emulator development in parallel with flight software development and
testing. Instead, simulators were considered one-off stop-gap development efforts that
were meant to solve particular problems or operate in niche areas. For example, suppose
that sample/example data needed to be produced to simulate a science instrument so
that flight software development could continue and maintain its schedule while the
science instrument’s development continues in parallel.

This science-instrument-

simulator would then be developed for its specific purpose, with it never being meant
to be integrated into a bigger simulation system, such as a SoST. In the few cases
where NASA developed SoST-like systems, the SoSTs were not of the maturation nor
the fidelity of the SoSTs discussed in this dissertation.
To help establish the timeline of the SoST invention, usage, and its results, a timeline has
been produced to give the reader more information on the SoST evolution over eight
years. During this time, this author has been completely involved with the concepts,
design, implementation, testing, and usage of SoSTs. Certain aspects of each of these
missions appears in this dissertation to “paint-the-picture” of a SoST system, its design,
implementation, and results.
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Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Spacecraft: 2011
The Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) Core Observatory spacecraft launched on
February 27, 2014. It is the anchor to the GPM international satellite mission to unify and
advance precipitation measurements from a constellation of research and operational
sensors to provide “next-generation” precipitation products. [43]
SoST Efforts Include:
•

Initial Concept

•

First spacecraft mission that was modeled as a SoST

•

One Compact PCI chassis was modeled, with one flight computer model

•

SoST named GPM Operational Simulator (GO-SIM) was utilized for fault injection
and dynamic analysis

•

GO-SIM was the 2016 Honorable Mention for NASA’s Software of the Year
Award

James Webb Space Telescope (JWST): 2015
The James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) is the infrared successor to the Hubble
Space Telescope. It is a cryogenic infrared space observatory with a 25 m 2 aperture (6
m class) telescope yielding diffraction-limited angular resolution at a wavelength of 2 um.
[44]
SoST Efforts Include:
•

Most complex spacecraft modeled at the time

•

Two redundant Compact PCI chassis were modeled, with four flight computer
models

•

SoST named JWST Integrated Simulation and Test (JIST) was utilized for static
analysis verification and various dynamic testing that focused on fault injection

•

JIST was the 2016 Honorable Mention for NASA’s Software of the Year Award
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Space Launch System (SLS): 2018
The flexible system, which can be configured for Orion, cargo, or Orion with comanifested payload missions, offers high escape velocities to send more mass to deep
space destinations. [45]
SoST Efforts Include:
•

Modeled triple-redundancy flight computers

•

Modeled custom-Boeing hardware and Compact PCI chassis

•

First time modeling a launch vehicle instead of a spacecraft

Simulation-to-Flight 1 (STF-1) 2017
The Simulation-to-Flight 1 (STF-1) CubeSat mission demonstrates how legacy simulation
technologies may be adapted for flexible and effective use on missions using the CubeSat
platform. These technologies, named NASA Operational Simulator (NOS), have
demonstrated significant value on several missions such as James Webb Space
Telescope, Global Precipitation Measurement, Juno, and Deep Space Climate
Observatory in the areas of software development, mission operations/training,
verification and validation (V&V), test procedure development and software systems
check-out. [46]
SoST Efforts Include:
•

Goal was to apply SoSTs to cubesats/smallsats

•

SoST invented for SmallSats and named the NASA Operational Simulator for
SmallSats (NOS3)

•

NOS3 won the 2019 Runner Up for NASA’s Software of the Year Award
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Psyche Spacecraft: 2019
The Psyche mission concept is enabled by electric propulsion and would use SPT-140
Hall thrusters to rendezvous and orbit (16) Psyche, the largest metal asteroid in the solar
system. [47]
SoST Efforts Include:
•

Begin modeling of JPL’s avionics and Compact PCI chassis

•

First JPL mission

•

Currently a Work in Progress
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3 Design, Implementation, and Deployment of a Software-only
Simulation Test Bed (SoST) for Flagship Spacecraft Missions
3.1 Introduction
This chapter discusses the design process, implementation considerations/methods, and
deployment of SoSTs for flagship spacecraft missions. The usage of the term “flagship”
refers to the large and ambitious Class-A/B missions that are high in public visibility,
usually hundreds of millions of dollars (plus) budgets, and multiple organizations involved;
examples include the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST), the Space Launch System
(SLS), and the Europa Clipper spacecraft among others. SoSTs are considered high
fidelity for flagship missions, meaning that the exact flight software binary is executed in
a test-as-you-flight configuration. Flagship missions do NOT include SmallSats nor
Cubesats, which are the subject of Chapter 4.
In this Chapter, the JWST spacecraft is utilized as an example.

Existing public

information, some of which was created by this author, is leveraged. The specific JWST
SoST is named the James Webb Space Telescope (JWST) Integrated Simulation and
Test (JIST) environment. JIST won Runner-Up in the 2012 NASA Software of the Year
Award [48].

3.2 SoST Design Process
The SoST Design Process is a custom process that has been created for SoST design
and implementation. This process is based upon an iterative software development
process but is significantly modified to incorporate additional SoST design activities such
as Test System Scoping, Planning and Analysis, and V&V Planning. This process is
followed for each unique mission SoST and is described in more detail below.
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Figure 7. SoST Custom Design Process

•

Test System Scoping Activity

As shown in Figure 7 above, the process [30] begins with the Test System Scoping
Activity that receives inputs such as the SoST user requirements and special user
requests. The Scoping Activity for SoSTs is unique in that it also includes mission artifacts
as inputs. For example, the mission’s test system assets, flight software source code,
V&V tests, specifications, and any existing simulators/emulators are considered, scoped,
and researched, as these artifacts could be extremely valuable during SoST design and
implementation. The outputs (shown in red) of this activity include the Test System Project
Plan and the V&V Plan. The Test System Project Plan is the first SoST design and
implementation plan, and its purpose is to drive the schedule and SoST scoping. The
V&V Plan is a detailed plan of the V&V performed on the SoST to ensure that it is accurate
once that it is completed. Ultimately, this activity is designed to be a gate review that
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requires buy-in from all stakeholders before the SoST development efforts continue for
the specific mission.
•

Planning and Analysis Activity

The Planning and Analysis Activity is the first step of the iterative design/implementation
process. This activity involves a mission architecture review, deep dive of mission
artifacts, determination of the flight software architecture and real-time operating system
(RTOS), and identification of crucial hardware spacecraft components and integration
points. This activity begins the process of identifying the correct CPU instruction set
simulator and SoST architecture. The outputs from this activity include a SoST Road
Map document that describes the SoST release cycle, major functionality for each
release, and a baseline set of high-level SHALL requirements that describe the specific
SoST.
•

Build, Test, and Verify

The Build, Test and Verify Activity is the main activity where SoST development, testing,
and initial verification is performed. For each iteration, a core set of features is developed
and tested along with the flight software functionality; thus, a parallel track to the flight
software development is established. This is the most labor-intensive activity and can be
considered three individual sub-phases: 1) Build, 2) Test and 3) Verify. Build activities
are discussed more in this chapter, whereas Test and Verify activities are discussed in
Chapter 6. The output from this activity is a SoST System Design Document that outlines
the architecture, functionality, and initial testing methods.
•

Validate

The Validate Activity tests the SoST against known test cases to ensure that the outputs
match hardware test beds’ outputs. The goal of this validation is to show that the SoST
is mature with accurate models, and that it is ready to begin flight software V&V activities.
More information on SoST testing and validation is discussed in Chapter 6. The output
from this activity is executed Validation Tests with disposition, which are tracked in an
issue tracker such as Gitlab or Atlassian’s JIRA tools.
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•

Release and Operations

The Release Activity is for performing a SoST release and entering an operational phase.
A SoST release follows the same industry-standard software engineering practices, which
includes the creation of virtual machines, closing and disposition of open issues, and
deployment. The output of this activity is the SoST itself (in the form of encapsulated
virtual machines), including a User’s Manual and Version Description Document (VDD),
which are standard NASA 7150.2C [49] standard deliverable documents. The VDD is
utilized to document the versions of all custom and integrated software in the SoST as a
baseline for future iterations, it lists new functionality in the release, any caveats or known
issues, and resolved bugs. Once the Release Activity completes, the process returns to
the Planning and Analysis Activity and repeats with incremental development until a future
release is performed.

3.3 Technical Design and Modeled Components
This section titled Technical Design and Modeled Components introduces the SoST
components and their technical design.

Integration and implementation of the

components are discussed in the next section. A SoST design is presented generically,
and then specific mission examples are utilized to give the reader more detailed design
information and context.
A SoST technical design is composed of several pieces, which are depicted in the
following Figure 8.

This figure is referenced several times during this dissertation

because it shows the individual components and shows the relationship of the
components in the entire integrated SoST. Each component, its creation, and design
are presented in the following subsections; also, and most importantly, the technical
methods of performing the component integration is discussed. In the figure, items in blue
represent external entities that are either integrated or “dropped-into” the SoST; blue
entities such as “Unmodified Flight Software Binary” (Spacecraft Segment) and “The
Operational Ground System” (Ground Segment) are discussed first. The purple items
represent inventions and creations for the SoST and are discussed in excruciating detail
in this section and the next.
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Figure 8. SoST Main Architecture

3.3.1 Ground Segment: Operational Ground System Software
The Operational Ground System represents the software that is utilized to command the
spacecraft and receive data (henceforth referred to as “telemetry”) from the spacecraft.
Obviously, the Ground System represents the “Ground Segment” (see Chapter 2), and
the software is also capable of executing scripts (series of multiple commands) using
basic logic constructs. A standard ground system scripting language is Systems Test
and Operations Language (STOL)[50]. With respect to SoSTs, the operational ground
system is the primary user interface and provides a graphical user interface (GUI) frontend to the spacecraft operations, as shown in Figure 9. This workflow matches actual
spacecraft operations that take place in the Mission Operations Center (MOC) during
spacecraft operations.
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Figure 9. Example Ground Software System

In SoSTs, the Ground System software integration provides the full spacecraft “day-inthe-life” capabilities. This allows for testing and verification of on-orbit commanding and
telemetry response. With the inclusion of a ground system, the SoST is also utilized for
ground operator training. For example, SoSTs have been utilized for testing stored
command sequences and ground commands before they are uplinked to an on-orbit
spacecraft. The SoST can also provide value later in the lifecycle than normal spacecraft
development and I&T phases by serving as a rapid-prototyping and virtualized test
environment.
Note that the Ground Station software is highlighted blue in Figure 8, indicating an
Integrated Software Component. Integrated Software Components are considered thirdparty software components that are treated as black boxes during SoST integration, often
integrated into the SoST by utilizing socket communications. For this integration to occur,
research on the ground software must be performed to determine socket ports,
server/client configurations, and the protocols being utilized. Figure 10 [51] shows how
the ground software, ECLIPSE [52], is an integrated part of the JIST SoST; ECLIPSE
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executes in its own Windows
Server

2003

virtual

machine,

interacts with the go-between
Telemetry Command Test Set
(TCTS) virtual machine which
emulates uplink and downlink
communications,

and

the

spacecraft virtual machine which
contains several emulators for the

Figure 10. Publicly Available JIST Configuration
Showing Virtual Machine Configuration

spacecraft.
Spacecraft operators interact with the SoST via the Ground Station software. Operators
are responsible for safely commanding the spacecraft, while testers/analysts are
responsible for testing the spacecraft by developing “What-If” test scenarios that are
designed to test and perform V&V on the spacecraft flight software.
3.3.2 Spacecraft Segment: Unmodified Flight Software Binary
Also highlighted in blue in Figure 8 is the Unmodified Flight Software Binary. This is the
binary executable that represents the software-under-test (SUT) in the SoST. The binary
executable is the actual flight software binary compiled for the flight architecture (e.g.,
PowerPC) and is meant to be a “drop-in” input to a SoST provided by the User. As the
flight software binary executes in the SoST, it “believes” that it is executing on actual
spacecraft hardware. No changes to the flight software binary are made, hence the use
of the term “unmodified” when describing it. Often, the unmodified flight software binary
is composed of 1) a real-time operating system (RTOS), 2) board-support-package
(BSP), 3) software/hardware drivers, and 4) the actual flight software that is responsible
for operating the spacecraft. As discussed in Chapter 2, in NASA, the actual flight
software is often based upon the CFS architecture.
3.3.3 Spacecraft Segment: Spacecraft Dynamics and Systems
The Spacecraft Dynamics component is shown as a separate entity in the Figure 8
diagram because it is often modeled and integrated separately from the main spacecraft
chassis.

The dynamics include gyroscopes, reaction wheels, solar panels, data

pg. 39

recorders, etc.

Spacecraft Dynamics represent the sensors and actuators responsible

for the control loops that make the flight software believe that it is operating on-orbit in an
actual space environment. Figure 11 shows the basic control loop for a spacecraft
attitude [53]; this example is provided to give the reader an understanding of the types of
hardware that is modeled as part of the Spacecraft Dynamics component.
Spacecraft control is outside the scope of
this dissertation and SoSTs, but its
integration is a vital component of a
SoST because it represents a fully
modeled

spacecraft;

Spacecraft

Dynamics must be included in the SoST,
or the flight software is not able to close
Figure 11. Example Control Loop for Spacecraft Attitude

outputs are missing.

its control loops because key inputs and

Without the Dynamics System adequately modeled, the flight

software still executes in the SoST, but it will not be executing in an operational on-orbit
“test-as-you-fly” configuration.
The internal timing synchronization of Spacecraft Dynamic hardware models and their
implementation/integration are discussed more in the next chapter; however, the design
of the hardware models will be discussed here. The process for modeling hardware such
as gyroscopes and reaction wheels follow this process:
1) Determine spacecraft architecture and hardware that needs modeling; create a list
of the hardware that composes the dynamics system.
2) Determine the software to use for the environmental inputs; a software solution is
needed to model the space environment, such as magnetic fields, solar wind,
possible GPS for low-earth orbit (LEO), star positions, etc.
3) Gather hardware documentation, specifically the User’s Manual and any available
specification documentation for the sensors and actuators. This documentation is
invaluable for modeling the specific hardware components.
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3.3.4 Spacecraft Segment: Modeled Spacecraft Hardware – Command and Data Handling
(C&DH)
Just as in the actual spacecraft, the C&DH system is the core component of the SoST
and often is the starting place for the SoST modeling efforts. The C&DH contains the
flight computer(s), compact PCI (cPCI) chassis, flight software, and utilizes registers,
memory, and interrupts to communicate with other cPCI cards. The cPCI backplane has
I/O modules that may include MIL-STD-1553, SpaceWire, analog to digital, data
recorders, and numerous others. This “system” must be fully recreated in software inorder for the flight software to execute nominally inside the SoST.
The process of modeling flight hardware begins with an instruction set simulator choice
for the target processor on the flight single-board computer (SBC) hardware.

This

simulator executes the assembly instructions found in the text segment of the flight
software binary. Example tools used to perform this task are Wind River’s Simics and the
open-source QEMU project. Memory visible to the CPU is laid out as it would appear in
the hardware. Segments such as RAM, EEPROM, NVRAM, and PCI mapped memory
are created in the virtual environment.
As a space flight system may contain multiple CPUs and other computing components
with independent clock sources, the timing, scheduling, and synchronization of each
component must be carefully considered in the SoST system integration.
The flight software interfaces with the hardware via registers, mapped memory, and
interrupts; these components must be modeled precisely as described in their hardware
specifications and interface control documents. A given hardware component, typically
an FPGA or ASIC, contains numerous (sometimes hundreds of) registers exposed to the
flight software’s device drivers. These registers control I/O devices such as MIL-STD1553, SpaceWire, and RS-232. The registers are also responsible for controlling the state
and reporting status data on the target SBC and other attached components.

The

hardware model requires recreation of these register behaviors in software, provide
interrupts based on internal and external events, and share data between the FSW and
the hardware via virtual mapped memory. Often, accurate hardware specifications are
not available for various reasons. In these cases, reverse engineering from the flight
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software is necessary to recreate the hardware behaviors but should be considered only
as a last resort.
3.3.5 Spacecraft Segment Integration: NASA Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine Middleware
SoST components must be integrated for data flow to occur. Similar to the actual
spacecraft hardware where data busses (e.g., I2C, SPI, MIL-STD-1553, SpaceWire)
connect devices to the flight SBC, a SoST also needs a data bus for information to flow
through the virtual spacecraft models to the flight software running under the instruction
set simulator.

In software-only systems, it is common for a software middleware

developed on top off TCP/IP sockets to provide the hardware models' data transport
mechanism. While this is true for simple software systems, there are many additional
software mechanisms that need to be developed for SoSTs to function correctly, with the
most important being synchronicity and timing of message data passing.

Timing

considerations are discussed more in the next chapter, but an introduction into the SoST
middleware design and timing is provided below.
The NASA Operational Simulator (NOS) Engine (named and designed by this author)
middleware was developed for the sole purpose of SoST integration of various
components, emphasizing time synchronization, as depicted in Figure 12. It can be
considered the “glue” of the system and is responsible for passing data between the
various components. NOS Engine provides a modular communications architecture and
a consistent and correct data passing mechanism for simulation components and
provides
software

the

user

with

a

application

programmer’s interface (API) for
different types of synchronous
communications. NOS Engine
consists of a base layer that
implements the NOS Engine
core, and all layers (e.g., MILSTD-1553, SpaceWire) are built
upon the base layer. NOS

Figure 12. NOS Engine SoST Architecture

pg. 42

Engine allows multi-part systems the opportunity to send messages back and forth
despite incompatible software. This type of integration, paired with advanced features like
time synchronization, data manipulation, and fault injection, allows NOS Engine to provide
a fast, flexible, and reusable system for connecting and testing various pieces of a SoST.
NOS Engine is built upon a conceptual model based on two fundamental types of objects:
nodes and buses. A node is any type of endpoint in the system capable of sending and
receiving messages. Any node in the system has to belong to a group, formally referred
to as a bus. A bus can have an arbitrary number of nodes, and each node within the bus
must have a unique name to all other member nodes. The nodes of a bus operate in a
sandbox; a node can communicate with another node on the same bus but cannot talk to
nodes that are members of a different bus.

Figure 13 depicts the bus and node

relationship.

Figure 13. Bus and Node Topology

NOS Engine is designed to operate in a client/server architecture for message distribution
instead of a full “mesh” distribution system. The server is classified as a centralized entity
through which all communication must pass. A client is defined as any entity that wishes
to interact with the system that is not the server. As a result, no client can directly
communicate with another client without first passing through the server. The server acts
as the arbiter of message delivery and processing in the system.
A client/server architecture was chosen over a mesh architecture for several reasons.
1. The development and design are more straightforward with a client/server
architecture. Mesh systems are of non-trivial complexity with regard to both design
and implementation.
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2. Due to the requirement that a single bus may contain multiple transports, each
client would need to maintain an active connection to every other endpoint that it
may communicate with. As the number of available transports increases, the
message passing logic increases in complexity exponentially.
3. The system's ability to provide interception and fault injection capabilities becomes
significantly easier if a centralized arbiter exists. Clients do not need to be aware
of an ever-changing list of interceptors associated with it. Also, the interceptor
delivery order does not need to be negotiated by each client.
4. A centralized server provides administrators an easy way to view a snapshot of
the system’s state due to all information being stored in one place.
NOS Engine provides a critical time distribution feature. The real power of time distribution
is not just broadcasting a time value, but rather the ability to synchronize SoST activity.
Time distribution is handled by two different node types: TimeSender and TimeClient. On
any given bus, there can be a single TimeSender and unlimited TimeClients. The
TimeSender has the sole responsibility of sending a time value. Each time a new time
value is sent, it is distributed to each TimeClient on the same bus. Synchronization is
possible since the TimeSender waits until each TimeClient has received the tick and
performed any activity. This allows activity to be synchronized between multiple clients
when each may take a different amount of “wall-time” to complete. Figure 14 illustrates
the behavior between the TimeSender and TimeClients when a time value is sent.

Figure 14: Time Distribution
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Note that TimeSender and TimeClient nodes are not registered and used directly in the
same way that a DataNode is. Instead, sending and receiving time is designed and
implemented directly into the Client::Bus class.
3.3.5.1

Setting SoST Bus Time

TimeSender nodes are not directly registered or used; instead, time sending is directly
implemented into Client::Bus. Time sending is enabled by calling Bus::enable_set_time;
and of course, there can only be one Bus instance enabled for setting time.
Once enabled, the Bus object is used to distribute time using the Bus::set_time(…) call.
The first parameter is SimTime (currently defined as a 64-bit signed integer). Note that
both enable_set_time and set_time have a timeout parameter. If a timeout is specified
and a response isn’t received from the server within the desired time, the request fails,
and an error is thrown.
The following example shows how to enable time and send a time message.
#include <Server/Server.hpp>
#include <Client/Bus.hpp>
#include <Utility/Error/Error.hpp>
int main(int, char**)

{

NosEngine::Server::Server server;
server.add_transport("copy://example:0");
NosEngine::Client::Bus bus_1("copy://example:0", "Bus_1");
// ERROR: set time is not enabled
try {
bus_1.set_time(0);
}
catch (NosEngine::Utility::Error::Error &e) {
std::cout << e << std::endl;
}
// Success
bus_1.enable_set_time();
// Send time 0 to all clients, blocks until all clients are done
bus_1.set_time(0);
}
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3.3.5.2

Receiving Bus Time

TimeClient nodes are also not directly registered or used; receiving of time is also
implemented directly into Client::Bus. To receive time, a ‘tick’ callback must be added to
the Bus. This callback is executed each time a time-value is received. Any work that
should be performed during the ‘frame’ should be completed during the callback (either
directly within or using condition variables to control other parts of the application). Once
the callback returns, the TimeSender has permission to send the next tick.
The following example shows how to receive the ‘tick’ within a callback function.
#include <iostream>
#include <Server/Server.hpp>
#include <Client/Bus.hpp>
using namespace NosEngine;
int main(int, char**) {
Server::Server server;
server.add_transport("copy://example:0");
Client::Bus bus_1("copy://example:0", "Bus_1");
bus_1.enable_set_time();
bus_1.set_time(0);
bus_1.add_time_tick_callback([](Common::SimTime time) {
//perform any work as necessary
std::cout << time << std::endl;
//...
//return when work is complete
});
// send time tick for every 10 units of time
for (Common::SimTime time = 10; time < 100; time += 10)
{
bus_1.set_time(time);
}
}

3.3.5.3

Retrieving Last Bus Time Received

The time for the last tick received can also be retrieved directly from a Client::Bus or
Client::Node instance via the get_time method. This method can be called from inside or
outside of a ‘tick’ callback, in fact this method will work even if no ‘tick’ callbacks have
been added to the Bus.
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#include <iostream>
#include <Server/Server.hpp>
#include <Client/Bus.hpp>
#include <Client/DataNode.hpp>
using namespace NosEngine;
int main(int, char**)
{
Server::Server server;
server.add_transport("copy://example:0");
Client::Bus bus_1("copy://example:0", "Bus_1");
bus_1.enable_set_time();
NosEngine::Client::DataNode *node_1 = bus_1.get_or_create_data_node("Node_1");
bus_1.set_time(0);
std::cout << "Time: "
<< "bus=" << bus_1.get_time() << " "
<< "node=" << node_1->get_time()
<< std::endl;
bus_1.set_time(100);
std::cout << "Time: "
<< "bus=" << bus_1.get_time() << " "
<< "node=" << node_1->get_time()
<< std::endl;
}

3.3.5.4

Timers

Sometimes in a SoST it is not desirable to have your ‘tick’ callback executed for every
time an update is received; this is where timers can be utilized. The Client::Bus class has
the following two methods, which allow for adding a timer which is executed once (and
only once).
void set_timer_absolute(Common::SimTime time, BusTimerCallback callback);
void set_timer_relative(Common::SimTime time, BusTimerCallback callback);

The BusTimerCallback has the following signature.
void timer_callback(Common::SimTime time, Common::SimTime requested_time)
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Note that for both absolute and relative timers, if the time provided is not a multiple of the
time sender’s period; then the callback is executed for the tick which occurs immediately
after the provided time. If the period is 1000 ms (simulated time), a wait for 150 ms (delta)
or 1150 ms (absolute) will return about 850 ms (simulated time) later than expected. It is
recommended to wait for multiples of the period.
An example of how to create timers is shown below:
#include <Server/Server.hpp>
#include <Client/Bus.hpp>
#include <Client/BusGroup.hpp>
using namespace NosEngine;
typedef Common::SimTime SimTime;
int main(int, char**)

{

Server::Server server;
server.add_transport("copy://example:0");
Client::Bus bus_1("copy://example:0", "Bus_1");
bus_1.enable_set_time();
bus_1.set_time(0);
// add a timer to be executed 10 units of time from current time
bus_1.set_timer_relative(10, [&bus_1](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
// add a timer to be executed 5 units of time from current time
bus_1.set_timer_relative(5, [&bus_1](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
});
});
// add a timer to be executed at time 50
bus_1.set_timer_absolute(50, [](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
});
// add a timer to be executed at time 52
bus_1.set_timer_absolute(52, [](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
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});
// add a timer to be executed at time 55
bus_1.set_timer_absolute(55, [](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
});
// add a timer to be executed at time 58
bus_1.set_timer_absolute(58, [](SimTime time, SimTime requested_time) {
std::cout << time << " " << requested_time << std::endl;
});
// send time tick for every 10 units of time
for (SimTime time = 10; time < 100; time += 10)
{
bus_1.set_time(time);
}
}

3.3.6 James Webb Space Telescope Integrated Simulation and Test (JIST) SoST Design WalkThrough
This section is meant to build upon the previous design sections in this chapter and
provide a walk-through of the design process and design decisions that are needed
before SoST implementation. This design process is specific to SoSTs and represents a
considerable advancement in the field of spacecraft simulation. This process fits into the
design process described in Section 3.2.
Figure 15 [54] is a publicly available JWST spacecraft architecture. When scoping and
planning a SoST, one must first thoroughly understand the spacecraft architecture, its
hardware components, flight software architecture, subsystems, and interfaces. The
SoST design approach is an iterative approach that focuses on refinement to reduce the
development risk.
First, focus on the Command and Data Handling (C&DH) subsystem (highlighted in blue),
as this contains the flight computer/CPU and interfaces to the other systems. Instrument
systems should be deferred until later in the development process as they often represent
secondary goals.
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Figure 15. Phase 1: Publicly Available JWST Architecture: C&DH Starting Point

Next, after the C&DH, focus on the communications and Attitude Control System (ACS)
subsystems, highlighted in yellow below. These subsystems contain custom hardware
that needs modeled in the SoST because they interface directly with the flight software.
Notice how the SoST architecture begins with the C&DH and then branches outward in
an iterative process.
Finally, as shown in Figure 16, the remaining interfaces that “touch” the C&DH system
need to be modeled. In this case, the science compact PCI chassis (highlighted in
orange) needs to be modeled because it contains bus I/O and its own flight computer.
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Figure 16. Phase 2: Architecture Decomposition for SoST Design: ACS and Comms

At this point, the critical components of the SoST architecture have been identified (Figure
17): C&DH, ACS, Communications, Power, and Science Instruments have been identified
as the hardware components that need scoped and understood in order for modeling
implementation to begin. The remainder of the spacecraft hardware includes instrument
hardware, detailed power system components, and ancillary communications hardware.
The method to determine the hardware models to develop/include in the SoST and what
hardware models to defer can be answered by considering the following question:
“What hardware does the flight software know about, and
does the flight software interact directly with it?”
Only modeling the hardware that the flight software directly interfaces with is an essential
tip for designing a SoST. It is too easy to want to model each hardware component or
spacecraft subsystem, but this is not feasible when considering time, budget, and labor.
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Figure 17. Additional Chassis and Flight Computer in SoST Scope

For a specific example, the James Webb Space Telescope Integrated Simulation and
Test (JIST) SoST architecture is shown in Figure 18 in the publicly available architecture
diagram [30], for which this author was a major contributor.

Figure 18. Publicly Available JIST Architecture
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Note that items in blue are custom hardware models developed specifically for this SoST,
items in green are integrated software components, and the virtual MIL-STD-1553 and
SpaceWire busses tie the software components together. A SoST design architecture
will very closely match the actual spacecraft hardware architecture.
Please keep in mind that there is no hardware in a SoST; these components are softwareonly, and implementation requires hardware abstraction and integration touchpoints that
are discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
The red and orange busses represent NOS Engine busses, and hardware components
are Clients on the NOS Engine bus. The details of each modeled component are
considered sensitive and are not provided in this text. However, their integration design
and implementation are presented.

3.4 Implementation and Integration
This section presents the implementation and integration of SoST components that have
been previously described in the design section. SoST integration is the most challenging
part of the iterative process, and thus, it requires an incredibly mature design. This section
also describes component implementations that utilize different technologies.

The

technologies are presented along with their specific components in order to fully describe
the SoST integration. Detailed examples that use both Wind River’s Simics ISS and the
open-source QEMU ISS are presented.
3.4.1 Flight Computer and Component Modeling
The Flight Computer model is the most critical component and is crucial to the SoST. The
accuracy of the Flight Computer model must be nearly perfect in order for the flight
software to execute correctly. In this stage, accuracy refers to how closely the model
matches the hardware so that the flight software cannot distinguish between the two. For
the initial implementation, an ISS must be chosen for the specific CPU computing
architecture. Currently, the PowerPC, LEON4, and ARM CPU architectures dominate the
space domain, and a compatible ISS needs to be chosen. Throughout this section, the
popular BAE RAD750 (PowerPC 750) flight computer, shown in Figure 19, is used as an
example reference SoST implementation.

Only referenced public RAD750
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information is utilized.

In some cases, the publicly

available PowerPC e600 CPU board is used as a RAD750
stand-in example when discussing SoST implementation.
The PowerPC e600 is a similar RISC big-endian, memorymapped I/O, System on a Chip (SoC) CPU.
Note, the ISS design and implementation are not discussed
in detail in this dissertation; the integration of the ISS is the
focus. For the initial discussion, the Wind River Simics
Figure 19. BAE RAD750 Flight Computer

instruction set simulator is utilized.

At its core, the ISS can translate flight CPU architecture (e.g., PowerPC) machine
instructions. Once the ISS is chosen, it needs to integrate with modeled peripherals (e.g.,
UART, discrete I/O, PCI bus, etc.). Detailed Flight Computer documentation is needed to
completely model the board and describe its peripherals, interrupts, RAM, EEPROM,
cPCI BAR registers, and memory maps. Having this documentation on-hand is critical to
begin modeling the flight computer.

Figure 20. Publicly Available BAE RAD750 Architecture for Initial Modeling
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The publicly available Figure 20 above [55] describes the internal architecture of the
RAD750 flight computer. Notice that the flight computer comprises various peripheralcomponents such as SpaceWire, RAM, UART, EEPROM, and MIL-STD-1553. This is a
ubiquitous architecture for both custom flight boards and Systems-On-Chip (SoC),
whereas the CPU is “surrounded” by peripheral-components (also known as “devices”),
often tied together via an internal I/O bus or Compact PCI (cPCI) bus. If a specific version
of flight software utilizes any of these devices, then the modeled flight computer must
include corresponding modeled virtual devices. This technique is useful for determining
what functionality and how much functionality to model. For example, if the flight software
does not use SpaceWire or MIL-STD-1553, this functionality should NOT be modeled on
initial iterations. Only model the needed behavior and functionality; refer to Chapter 5.2
for more information.
3.4.1.1

Components and Memory
Mappings

The

flight

computer

model

is

considered a Component object in
software, and the peripherals are
considered

“Device

Objects,”

as

shown in Figure 21. The higher-level
component CONTAINS devices, and

Figure 21. Software Objects Hierarchy of Components and Devices

the component is responsible for
aggregating the devices into a functional flight computer model. Notice the similarity
between actual hardware system architectures and the software-only modeling
architecture. The architectures are meant to be similar, with the differences being the
software-layer that connects components-to-components and devices-to-components,
providing an abstraction layer.
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Components can be represented by
any computer language, with C and
Python being the most common for
SoSTs. If Python is utilized, then an
object-oriented methodology is used,
which

naturally

follows

the

component architecture depicted in
Figure 21.

Software objects are

added to Components to form a flight
computer that contains devices. For
example, Figure 22 shows how a

Figure 23. Python Snippet Showing Devices Added to a
Flight Computer Component

specific PowerPC e600 flight computer model in Python CONTAINS a UART/serial port,
disk controllers, timers, and a real-time clock (RTC). The critical part of this concept is to
understand that the component is made up of many objects, with those objects being
devices that need further definition and models developed in either Python or C. The
component ties the devices together into a working flight computer board. Figure 23

Figure 22. Publicly Available RAD750 Architecture Showing Device Models
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illustrates the concept of “device-models” by showing the RAD750 hardware architecture
overlayed in blue with the corresponding software device models.
There is a one-to-one mapping so that the SoST architecture matches the hardware
architecture.

The mapping of devices to memory addresses also occurs in the

Component. For example, in Figure 24, the Python code shows that the devices’ base
addresses define the flight computer’s physical memory map. The actual devices are
then mapped into the SoST’s flight computer model’s virtual memory by using the device’s
offset address. This mechanism in the SoST is similar to the actual hardware method for
mapping devices into memory address space for PowerPC CPUs. Up to this point, how
the components manage the device objects has not been fully explained; in order to better
understand the implementation, the device models need a detailed explanation.
3.4.1.2

Device Modeling

Device Modeling is performed on individual devices then aggregated together to build
larger

component

models,

such as the flight computer
board. Device Models can be
implemented in nearly any
language, specifically Python,
System-C,

C,

Device

Modeling Language (DML), or
C++ in the SoST. If using the
QEMU ISS, then C or C++ will
be the language of choice; if
using Wind River’s Simics
ISS,

several

choices

are

available, notably DML, a Clike language is auto-coded to
C.

Once

developed,

the

models are integrated using a
composition

object-oriented

Figure 24. Mapping Devices to Memory Layout
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(OO) paradigm, where each device represents a software object that forms the entire
flight computer board model.
Memory devices are the simplest to model, as they represent a memory area on the host
computer that is addressable in a specific range in the SoST. For example, if a PowerPC
e600 has an addressable RAM range from 0x00 to 0x10000 and an addressable
EEPROM range from 0x20000 to 0x40000, then heap memory objects (allocated with
malloc() or new() in the SoST) can be created on the host computer and utilized in the
SoST for the memory objects. The ISS, via its various software mechanisms, can map
the heap memory into the SoST virtual-CPU address space so that the virtual-CPU now
has virtual RAM and EEPROM address ranges. In SoSTs, the electrical characteristics
of the RAM/EEPROMS are NOT modeled because these details are usually not required
from the flight software’s perspective. Refer to Chapter 5.2 for details on applying the
correct level of modeling fidelity.
Other than memory devices, the device/peripherals require significant modeling that
includes I/O address space mapping, register mapping, interrupts, direct-memory-access
(DMA), First-In-First-Out (FIFOs), and their respective behavior.

For example, a

reference star tracker cPCI device is described below (in Figures 25 – 27) and annotated
in DML for conceptual readability. Each aspect of the Star Tracker’s model is discussed,
but some ancillary details have been removed for clarity.
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Declare the device and
its methods. Methods
are
any
general
processing activities that
the model needs to
perform.

Figure 25. Star Tracker Model Part 1
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Declare
banks
of
registers as needed for
the Star Tracker per its
documentation

Registers can be any size in the
model, as dictated by the hardware
architecture. This Star Tracker uses
16-bit registers. Note that if the Star
Tracker is utilized with a PowerPC
CPU ISS, the FSW will access two 16bit Star Tracker registers per access,
because the PowerPC is 32-bit. This
must be carefully managed in the
device model.

Each register can have its
own read/write method
definition that is invoked
when FSW accesses the
register.
Figure 26. Star Tracker Model Part 2

The model must also
declare and raise/lower
any interrupts. For this
model, the interrupt is
raised
when
the
centroid is calculated.
The interrupt is tied to
the PowerPC ISS
Figure 27. Star Tracker Model Part 3

For PowerPC architectures, devices are memory-mapped, meaning that their registers
for status/control and behavior are mapped to specific memory locations. Then, the flight
software accesses those registers via its virtual memory addressing. The device model
must execute in the virtual-time context (See Chapter 3.4.3) and also handle the
appropriate interrupt mappings to the virtual PowerPC CPU ISS.

There is a single
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interrupt for the PowerPC CPU whose input is often multiplexed from various peripheral
devices, including cPCI. The entirety of these virtual-hardware interactions occurs in the
software-only context. For example, registers are constructs of the model, and interrupts
are “virtual signals” in software that are connected via the component model to devices.
3.4.2 Advanced SoST Modeling Techniques
The majority of SoSTs developed to date have utilized a Compact PCI architecture as the
system bus. In the actual hardware system, the flight computer is a cPCI “card,” and the
missions develop custom flight cPCI cards with various FPGAs providing register banks,
FIFOs, DMAs, and interfacing to external peripherals. Flight software interacts with
hardware via the cPCI bus by utilizing PCI Plug-N-Play (PnP) and initializing the Base
Address Registers (BARs) in cPCI Configuration Space. Flight software writes to the
cPCI BAR registers, which maps the cPCI card/device into the CPU’s address space.
These activities are standard PCI transactions; for more information on the PCI bus, refer
to its standard. Modeling PCI transactions in a SoST, and their synchronicity, are the
subject of this section.
3.4.2.1

Modeling of Synchronous Transactions

Synchronicity is a fundamental feature of SoSTs and is needed to ensure consistency
and accuracy when executing the flight software. A synchronous system is implemented
by utilizing a cycle-accurate ISS and converting real-world hardware events into
synchronous events in the software-only model.
For contrasting real-world systems with software-only (or virtualized) systems, real-world
(especially real-time systems) operate on a processing schedule, usually with polling
hardware drivers that are not interrupt-driven. Wall-clock time continues to move forward
in real-world systems, regardless of the CPU execution; often, a synchronization method
is utilized to sync the wall-clock time with the real-time system clock.
In contrast, software-only systems, such as SoSTs, utilize a virtual-CPU (e.g., ISS) that
executes in a simulation time context. Simulation time is joined with the ISS execution
and does not correlate to wall-clock time. The ISS becomes the time master of the SoST
and is responsible for driving the virtual “time-tick” to the entire SoST. The “time-tick”
drives the simulation and can be stopped, paused, or restarted. Often, the “time-tick”
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corresponds to an X number of CPU cycles; thus, for each step forward in virtual time,
the ISS will perform X CPU cycles in addition to allowing input/output to also execute.
Stopping or pausing the “time-tick” will stop/pause the entire SoST execution in a known
state, which is a significant advantage for SoSTs over their hardware equivalents. The
stopping/pausing its state is a unique property of SoSTs; hardware test beds are not
capable of pausing complete CPU execution.
Referring to its design, Section 3.3.5
and in Figure 28, NOS Engine is
utilized for time distribution between
the

SoST

components.

Each

component is linked to the SoST by
implementing

the

standard

NOS

Engine API interface; thus, it is able to
consume ticks and operate as a
synchronous member of the system.

Figure 28. NOS Engine Usage for Time Synchronization

For example, the following two Figures demonstrate a Novatel GPS model using NOS
Engine’s time synchronization to provide periodic Position-Velocity-Time (PVT) to the
other SoST components.

Figure 29 shows that the GPS Model [56] uses the

add_time_tick_callback() function to define a function pointer to the send_periodic_data()
function (Figure 30). Thus, on every received time-tick from the NOS Engine Time
Sender, the GPS model will execute the send_periodic_data() function and emulate the
PVT for the model. This data is then written over the virtual UART interface so that the
SoST’s virtual flight computer believes that it is communicating with a GPS on its UART
interface in real-wall-clock-time. All transactions are synchronous, meaning that the flight
computer model is not aware that an arbitrary wall-clock time has elapsed.

Figure 29. GPS Model Adding a Callback for Received Time Tick
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Figure 30. GPS Model send_periodic_data() Function

3.4.2.2

Functional Modeling of Direct Memory Access (DMA)

Memory

Banks

and

Register

modeling was covered previously,
but a natural extension of the two
is Direct Memory Access (DMA)
Engine

modeling,

with

its

architecture shown in Figure 31.
DMA is often used by the custom
cPCI hardware to transfer data to
peripherals, store incoming data
from

peripherals/busses,

and

Figure 31. DMA Engine Architecture and SoST Equivalent

transfer data between the flight
computer and the cPCI peripheral efficiently. Because DMA is essential to all spacecraft
architectures, its modeling is described here in detail.
From the SoST hardware perspective, DMA can be considered a moving-of-bytes-fromone-address location to another address location. To facilitate this transfer, registers that
control the DMA must first be defined and implemented in the model so that the flight
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software can utilize them for DMA initialization and operation. For example, a standard
DMA would have registers similar to the ones defined in Figure 32.
The flight computer writes to the
modeled registers to setup the
DMA Engine per its specification.
Behind the scenes, the DMA
Engine model needs to initialize
the engine and prepare the RAM
for future operations. Once the
DMA is setup, its model will begin
operation by writing to a particular
register
“ENABLED”

typically
or

named

“START_EN.”

When the model sees a “1” written
to this register by flight software, it
will then proceed to execute its

Figure 32. Representative DMA Register Definitions

function (such as a MIL-STD-1553 transaction) and copy bytes into a ready-buffer in RAM
on the cPCI I/O card. Once the DMA operation is complete, the model needs to inform
the flight computer by writing a “1” to a DMA_COMPLETE register, which will either be
polled by the flight software or serviced by an interrupt service routine.
Note that because the SoST is a synchronous system, this DMA transaction by default
will execute in what appears to be instantaneous time to the flight computer’s perspective.
In some cases, this is not ideal because the flight computer expects DMA transactions to
occur within a pre-determined time that is a characteristic of the hardware. This time
delay will most likely need modeled and allow the SoST to run forward in virtual-time so
as to emulate the DMA transaction wall-clock time. Failure to do this can cause the flight
computer software to miss the DMA_COMPLETE state if it is not polling for it yet in its
processing schedule. This is a common SoST model development bug that needs careful
design and attention to avoid.
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3.4.3 MIL-STD-1553: Synchronous Modeling of Input / Output (I/O) Interfaces
Up to this point the modeling of registers, memory banks, and DMA have been discussed
in a synchronous context. Data busses and I/O interfaces represent the last set of SoST
components to model in order to perform complete system integration.
Standard spacecraft interfaces include MIL-STD-1553, SpaceWire, custom serial
protocols utilizing RS232/RS485, and Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C) and Serial Peripheral
Interface (SPI). Each of these data bus interfaces can be modeled to various fidelity
levels depending upon the specific functionality needed. For example, higher fidelity
SoSTs model the MIL-STD-1553 to the transaction level, even going so far as modeling
the transaction time and intermessage-gap time in microseconds. Otherwise, the data
busses can be abstracted to a higher software mechanism that performs synchronous
data transfer and does not model protocols nor electrical characteristics. The desired level
of fidelity is left to the designer to choose based upon the SoST requirements and planned
use-cases. Data bus hardware maps itself into the flight computer’s address space and
is accessed via memory-mapped I/O operations, DMA, or control/status registers.
The SoST modeling architecture for interfaces will closely match the actual hardware
architecture. For example, the MIL-STD-1553 publicly available Summit architecture [57]
is shown in Figure 33 and Figure 34; this architecture is useful for describing the SoST
1553 model design and implementation. The 1553 Engine is usually embedded on a
cPCI card or auxiliary device that can communicate with the flight software via a DMA
interface.

Figure 33. Typical MIL-STD-1553 Architecture: Public Summit Example
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Figure 34. 1553 Architecture with Unneeded Modeling Components Shaded

The Summit architecture demonstrates two main parts: 1) The Engine (labeled “Summit”)
in the figure and 2) the transceivers. When modeling 1553 and other data busses, only
the “forward-facing” hardware that interacts with the flight software/flight computer should
be considered for high fidelity modeling. As shown in Figure 34, the transceivers, JTAG
debug, and AUTO-INIT Bus do not need to be modeled.

These components are

superfluous to its operation and are not directly “seen” by the flight software.
Figure 35 highlights in green the interfaces that require modeling, along with the
transceivers being replaced with a software abstraction layer using NOS Engine. Most
often, the Summit Engine is a 1553 Bus Controller (BC) that utilizes DMA to transfer data
between the Remote Terminals (RTs) and the flight software. Internally, the BC contains
registers and interrupts that need modeled using previously discussed methods. NOS
Engine’s implementation for synchronous MIL-STD-1553 is described below.
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Figure 35. Summit SoST Modeling Architecture

3.4.3.1

NOS Engine Client and MIL-STD-1553 Plugin

If a SoST wishes to contain both a virtual NOS Engine Bus Controller and Remote
Terminal hub, two unique connections must be made to the NOS Engine server. The Bus
Controller (“BC”) is the object on the network used to initiate all bus traffic. Currently, the
creation of the BC object on the bus will result in the creation of a data node called “bc.”
Remote Terminals (RTs) are not directly created by a user on the bus. RTs are instead
attached to a user created Remote Terminal Hub. The hub is responsible for distributing
1553 messages to user-designated callbacks in device models as needed. Each hub may
represent multiple RTs at any given time (See Figure 36). They may be added and
removed from the SoST system at runtime as needed. SoST designers are then provided
with a representation of an RT to use to respond to the message.
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RT 1

Server

Hub

RT 5

RT 20

Figure 36. RT communication through the NOS Engine MIL-STD-1553 Hub

All messages are received for a given RT synchronously through the provided callback
during RT registration. The callback is used to represent the entirety of an RT, meaning
that both the receiving and transmission of all data for all subaddresses are expected to
be handled. In the event of a broadcast message on the bus, all provided callbacks will
be called. Each callback is required to acknowledge the broadcast message before bus
communication can proceed, thus maintaining synchronicity.
The NOS Engine MIL-STD-1553 plugin library provides designers with several convenient
methods for inserting or extracting protocol information from a given message.
“Userspace” protocol elements of data messages are relatively simple. The following
table describes the components of the data protocol.
Table 6. MIL-STD-1553 Scenarios
Scenario
BC send data to RT
(Receive Request)
BC request data from RT
(Transmit Request)

BC -> RT Message
[Command Word]
[Word Count]
[Data]
[Command Word]

RT -> BC Response
[Error Code]
[Status Word]

RT Ignores transaction
(Either receive or transmit)

[Command Word]
[Optional Data]

[Error Code]
[Status Word]
[Word Count]
[Data]
[Error Code]
[Status Word]

BC Broadcast Data

[Command Word]
[Optional Data]

[Error Code]
[Status Word]

Notes

An automatic Status
Word is sent for the
server to interpret the
message. It is ignored by
the BC
The Error Code portion
of the message is always
returned as “No Error.”

pg. 68

The requirements for 1553 communications within the NOS Engine server are very
minimal. This is mostly due to the fact that the majority of work performed on a 1553 bus
is simply data passing. Interactions between nodes are not complicated, and therefore,
the Base Layer of NOS Engine can mostly be relied upon to perform the work.
The server-side implementation of the plugin provides a specialized 1553 bus class and
router for use. The work performed by these classes is minimal and only performed in a
small number of cases. The most common of these special operations is the association
of an RT address with an existing data node. A select protocol command is processed to
report the association. The server-side work is mostly directing messages to a given RT
on an associated node. This allows the 1553 layer to be more dynamic than the traditional
Base Layer. For example, any time an RT is successfully associated with a data node, all
interceptors for that RT are added to the data node.

3.5 Deployment and Usage
Eight years ago, when SoSTs’ design and implementation began, there were no software
tools available to assist with virtual machine creation or distribution. Virtual Machine (VM)
technologies existed and were sufficiently mature at the time, and thus SoSTs have
always supported and promoted virtualization for their deployments. Virtual Machines
are convenient for SoSTs but do inherently involve maintenance activities that need to be
addressed and scheduled. Most notably, VMs often require significant storage space,
with sizes quickly reaching 50+ Gigabytes (GB) per VM configuration; this size can limit
deployment options and decrease deployment time, as VMs need to be copied and
shared. Also, and more importantly, once SoST VMs are copied, deployed, and utilized,
then configuration management (CM) policies must be implemented for the SoST VMs.
CM, on such large files coupled with their configuration and deployment, can be
complicated and become unwieldy. For example, if User Y wants a flight software version
change for a SoST VM, then CM questions arise such as:
•

Will the change be made for just User Y?

•

Will the change be made for the entire SoST Baseline for future users?

•

Will the change be made for all users immediately?
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•

How will the change be distributed to the user(s)? It is not feasible to deploy 50+
GB SoSTs to a large number of users.

3.5.1 Ready-To-Run Virtualization Implementation
The solution for this is to implement VM provisioner technologies for SoSTs, thus
eliminating the CM challenges of managing large-sized VMs. Provisioners allow VMs to
be created “on-the-fly” from a set of source code files that can remain under CM version
control. Instead of distributing large SoST VMs, only the VM’s “generation scripts” need
to be distributed so that users can generate their own VM on their own VM infrastructure.
The “generation scripts” can be maintained in a standard source control CM repository
and modified as needed to support many users.
3.5.2 Implementation Details for Auto-Deployment of a SoST
This section describes the details of implementing auto-deployment for the NASA
Operational Simulator for SmallSats (NOS3) SoST. The theory and implementation
details presented here for NOS3 apply to all SoSTs. Because NOS3 is now NASA opensource, its auto-deployment is very important for its massive user base.
The NOS3 collection of software components are conveniently packaged as a ready-torun virtual machine, reducing the overhead associated with installing and configuring
each software component. NOS3 can be distributed as an Oracle VirtualBox virtual
machine image or as a collection of command scripts that are used to recreate and modify
a virtual machine image. This allows users to have a common development and testing
environment, further reducing risk to the mission. The standard guest operating system
utilized by NOS3 is Ubuntu Linux, but the virtual machine can execute using Oracle
VirtualBox on Windows, Mac, or Linux computers.
To get started with NOS3, a user only needs to install Oracle VirtualBox and Vagrant on
their host computer. Both of these software packages are open source and can be run
on various operating systems, including Microsoft Windows, Apple OS X, and Linux. In
addition to those software packages, NOS3 comprises a collection of files stored in a git
repository. To get started with NOS3, the user receives a copy of those files and places
them on their computer. These files include a Vagrantfile, which is a file that is used by
the Vagrant software package to create an Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine where all of
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NOS3 is executed. During the Ubuntu Linux Virtual Machine creation, various software
packages are installed, including COSMOS, 42, and the NOS Engine libraries and NOS
Standalone Server. An alternative to starting with Vagrant is to receive an already
generated VirtualBox Virtual Machine with the various packages installed or utilize the
same provisioner script on an Ubuntu 14.04 virtual machine/host; however, to build and
run the core flight software, simulators, and so on, the source code will still need to be
present as described below.
Finally, source code for various simulators is present on the virtual machine through
synced folders, which allow access to the same files on the host computer and the virtual
machine computer. Build tools can be used on the virtual machine to build and install
these simulators, such as a GPS simulator, a magnetometer simulator, an antenna
simulator, and more. Also, two special software tools are built and installed as part of the
simulators. The first is a NOS time driver, which provides time ticks to drive time for the
various simulators, 42, and the flight software. The second is a simple terminal program
that the operator can use to command and control other simulators using a separate NOS
engine command bus that all of the simulators can be nodes on.
In addition, the cFS flight software source code is also present on the virtual machine
through synced folders. Build tools can be used to build and install the generic flight
software also. This flight software includes hardware libraries that can interface as nodes
on NOS Engine busses in place of the real hardware node and bus connections.
The following two figures, Figure 37 and Figure 38, show an example auto-VM creation
file that is maintained under CM and utilized to generate ready-to-run NOS3 SoST VMs.
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Multiple host OSs
are supported

VM characteristics
are always defined
for consistency

Figure 37. NOS3 Deployment Example - Part I
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During VM generation invoke
shell provisioner and execute
several shell scripts (SH) for
installing specific software

Exit the provisioner, reboot the
VM, then enjoy the fresh NOS3
SoST VM

Figure 38. NOS3 Deployment Example - Part II
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The following steps are shown in Figures 39 through 44 to illustrate the typical SoST ease of
installation.
1. Open a command terminal and navigate to the directory where NOS3 was unzipped.

Figure 39. Command Terminal

2. Execute “windows_nos3_installer.bat”, “linux_nos3_installer.sh”, “pi_nos3_installer.sh”.
Note if using linux or pi, may need to dos2unix the file before running.
Example: ‘dos2unix linux_nos3_installer.sh’

Figure 40. Run Installer Script

3. The command prompt will be renamed with the disclaimer displayed.

Figure 41. Disclaimer
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4. Confirm you have read the disclaimer by pressing ‘Y.’

Figure 42. Level of Install

5. The level of install by entering 1, 2, or 3.
a. Each level builds upon the previous one with minimal, or ‘1’, being the base

Figure 43. Complete Configuration
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6. Wait for the installation process to complete - Completion is certain once the script exits
as displayed below:

Figure 44. Installation Complete
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4 SoSTs for SmallSats and CubeSats
4.1 Introduction
The last ten years have witnessed the revolution and exponential growth of SmallSats /
CubeSats in the commercial and government sectors. However, according to the 2019
NASA Ames Research Center study titled, Small-Satellite Mission Failure Rates [16]
“…41.3% of all small satellites launched experienced total or partial mission failure.
Of these, 6.1% were launch vehicle failures, 11% were partial mission failures, and 24.2%
were total mission failures.”
Also

of

significant

importance

to

this

research,

as

noted

in

this

report,

“Another reason [for the failures] could be that as the small satellite software complexity
has increased, the methods used to perform verification and validation of the small
satellite software has not increased commensurately.”
SmallSats that have a primary science focus (excluding Department of Defense
SmallSats to some degree) continue to evolve into complicated and constrained missions,
with a historical lack of mission assurance that needs to be addressed throughout the
industry. Future SmallSats will be interplanetary constellations that will require significant
testing, lower failure rates, and increased software robustness and reliability to
successfully meet the stringent mission objectives and goals but with lower costs.
The goal of this chapter is to discuss the application of SoSTs to SmallSats and
CubeSats. (The term “SmallSats” is used interchangeably with CubeSats.) Flagship
missions (as discussed previously) have different (i.e., more formalized) development
lifecycles than SmallSats, and thus, SoSTs for SmallSats also need to be developed and
applied in different ways in order to be effective. Part of this research and dissertation is
identifying and defining the process of successfully applying SoST technologies to
SmallSats in ways that make sense and have a considerable return-on-investment that
significantly improves their mission assurance and flight software V&V. The goal is to
determine if SoSTs can be innovative technologies that can help SmallSats succeed
without significant cost increases. Or stated differently, “Can SoSTs be an invaluable tool
for SmallSat development?”
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4.2 Considerations for Designing a SoST for a SmallSat Mission
A spinoff of applying SoSTs to flagship missions is the new application of SmallSats.
SmallSat missions are different from flagship missions in multiple ways and thus requires
a different SoST design approach. Table 7 outlines the main differences between flagship
and SmallSat missions and describes the SoST design and implementation impact.
Essentially, individual SoSTs need to scale up or down in design and implementation in
order to serve as an effective development and V&V platform.
Table 7. Differences Between Flagship and SmallSat Missions

Characteristic
Flagship mission budgets are
exponentially larger than SmallSats

SoST Impact
SoST budgets for engineering and implementation will often
track the mission budget. For smaller SmallSat missions,
SoST budgets will also be considerably smaller.

Flagship mission schedules and
timelines are orders of magnitude
longer than those of SmallSats

The point of SmallSats is to engineer and launch a
spacecraft in a short timeframe (~2 years), as opposed to
flagship missions such as JWST, which have been in
development for 10+ years.
SoSTs have to have a quicker development schedule and
thus be less complex for SmallSats.

Flagship missions have more personnel
and relatively fewer test resources

SmallSats often have a small core test team. Flagship
missions have several test teams, thus requiring additional
test hardware resources. This can make SoSTs in higher
demand for Flagship missions.

Flagship missions are more complex,
often in the Attitude Control System
(ACS) requirements

ACS requires significant testing, and flagship missions
require additional V&V, which SoSTs can assist with.
SmallSats can take advantage of SoSTs in the spacecraft
development phases.

Flagship missions often operate in
deep space, thus requiring more
specialized hardware

Specialized hardware results in fewer FlatSats and hardware
test beds. The trend for more specialized hardware
continues to become more complex and functional for
SmallSats as well.
SoSTs, now and in the near future, will require more
specialized hardware modeling, particularly in the cases of
Compact PCI and bus I/O.

Applying SoSTs to SmallSats requires a “Risk Reduction Mindset.” Instead of supporting
formal development and V&V phases as is done with flagship missions, SoSTs should
be infused into the SmallSat development lifecycle at critical points where targeted
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mission risk reduction can be performed. An adopted “Risk Reduction Mindset”
throughout the entire development, and testing lifecycle can drive and prioritize the test
program activities. For example, for the smaller SmallSat teams where the engineers
often have multiple roles of both developers and testers, the engineers can continuously
ask themselves, “How can I reduce the component risk of on-orbit failure?” Ingraining this
agile thought process into the entire lifecycle aligns with a SoSTtest-driven approach. It
empowers the engineers to take ownership of the risk reduction, testing, and development
phases, thus providing “risk ownership” and an overall lowered risk profile for the entire
SmallSat mission.
Consideration also has to be given to the fidelity of the SmallSat SoST so that it is best
tailored for the mission. Even within SmallSat missions, their requirements can be diverse
and very different. If flagship missions require a high-to-medium fidelity SoST, then
SmallSat missions require a medium-to-low fidelity SoST. The definitions of fidelity are
loose and do not follow strict definitions in this dissertation because each mission is a
different scope with different goals. Choosing the correct level of fidelity is discussed more
in Chapter 5.2.
Table 8 shows the typical design differences between FlagShip Mission SoSTs and
SmallSat SoSTs. These design differences are driven by the previous table that outlines
the major differences between SmallSats and flagship missions. There is more flexibility
in the design of SoSTs for SmallSats; for example, instruction set simulators may not be
required, and executing the test-as-you-fly binary may also not be required. However,
SmallSat SoSTs will still utilize the NOS Engine middleware to integrate various
components, the ground software system will be included and integrated, and hardware
models will be developed and integrated.
Table 8. Comparison of Flagship Mission and SmallSat Mission SoSTs

Characteristic
Utilizes NOS Engine
Utilizes an instruction set simulator
Complete Test-As-You-Fly configuration
Contains hardware component models
Includes Ground Software System (e.g., COSMOS)
Contains actual hardware-in-the-loop

Flagship
YES
YES
YES
YES
YES
NO, but is a
future feature

SmallSat
YES
Sometimes, Not Always.
Depends upon desired fidelity
Sometimes. Depends upon
desired fidelity
YES
YES
Sometimes
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4.3 SoST: The NASA Operational Simulator for SmallSats (NOS3)
4.3.1 STF-1 CubeSat Introduction
As a result of the demonstrated successes of SoSTs for flagship missions and the
opportunity to launch a spacecraft to demonstrate and test technologies that benefit
SmallSat missions, the NASA IV&V Program and West Virginia University (WVU)
collaborated to develop a 3U CubeSat mission, named Simulation-to-Flight 1 [46]. This
author was one of three primary authors of the STF-1 proposal. The primary purpose of
STF-1 was to determine and demonstrate the value of developing, utilizing, and
maintaining a SoST during the project lifecycle. However, a diverse set of science
experiments provided by WVU allowed the project to expand the mission’s overall
objective.

The instruments included a cluster of Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems

(MEMS) Inertial Measurement Units (IMU) to produce attitude knowledge; a spaceweather experiment including a Geiger counter and Langmuir probe; a III-V Nitride-based
materials optoelectronics experiment; and a Novatel OEM615 GPS coupled with
advanced algorithms for more precise orbit determination. The science experiments
enhanced the mission capabilities and provided a diverse set of instruments to assess
how the simulator would support science instrument development. Figure 45 illustrates
the various components and
subsystems

of

the

STF-1

CubeSat mission.
4.3.2 NOS3 Architecture Design
While STF-1 is not the focus of
this dissertation, the STF-1
mission

did

development
SmallSat

result
of

SoST

in

the

the

first

named

the

NASA Operational Simulator for
Small Satellites (NOS3). The
goal of NOS3 is to enhance
small

satellite

software

development,

Figure 45. STF-1 CubeSat Components

testing, and training. NOS3 provides the flight software with representative real-world
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simulated data inputs that it would expect during nominal on-orbit operations. Some of
the NOS3 features include:
•

Enabling multiple developers to build and test flight software with simulated
hardware models

•

Serving as an interface simulator for science instrument/payload teams to
communicate with before hardware integration

•

Supporting software development activities

•

Enabling hardware integration in parallel with software development activities

•

Providing an automated testing framework

•

Increasing available test resources

•

Enabling operation of the simulated spacecraft using the ground software
command and telemetry databases.

The flexible configuration of the NOS3 simulation architecture as compared to a typical
flight system is illustrated in Figure 46. The Flight Configuration column provides a typical
small satellite flight configuration for the flight software: i.e., flight applications, flight
libraries, drivers, and flight hardware. The flight software may use flight libraries that
provide common functionality. The flight software and libraries utilize hardware drivers,
defined as software components communicating directly with the hardware. This is
usually accomplished via reading and writing hardware registers and often using a bus
protocol such as Universal Asynchronous Receive and Transmit (UART), Inter-Integrated
Circuit (I2C), and Serial Peripheral Interface (SPI), or merely applying general-purpose
input/output (GPIO) signals. Note that the Simulation Configuration (right column of
Figure 46 below) is identical to the Flight Configuration (left column), with the exception
being that NOS Engine replaces the Flight Hardware. This is important because the
Drivers, Flight Libraries, and Flight Applications remain the same regardless of the Flight
Configuration or the Simulation Configuration is being utilized.
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Figure 46. NOS3 architecture illustrating its Flexible Flight & Sim Configuration.

A typical SmallSat has numerous hardware interfaces controlled through an on-board
computer. These may include hardware interfaces with electrical power systems, radio
frequency communication systems, science experiment payloads, orbit, attitude sensing
and control systems. The goal of NOS3 is to substitute simulations in place of some or
all of these hardware components.
The Simulation Configuration column demonstrates how NOS3 can be utilized in place of
the actual hardware. It should be noted that the NOS3 architecture provides users with
the flexibility to execute flight software with some or all of the hardware components
replaced by a software simulation. This substitution occurs at the functional call interface.
Performing the substitution is as simple as linking the flight software against a NOS3
library to replace the hardware driver library. NOS3 utilizes a client-server architecture,
and as such, a standalone NOS3 server manages the communications between flight
software and various hardware components.

The stand-alone server maintains the

components, referred to as NOS Engine nodes, that are attached to each hardware bus,
the communications protocol used, etc.

Additionally, NOS3 includes a logging

mechanism so that communications between simulation components can be monitored
in real-time or in post-analysis to ensure that the data is passed correctly.
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The hardware components that are being substituted with software simulations can be
modeled at the fidelity required for the tests being performed. Some of the simulators
written for STF-1 simply implemented pre-packaged data responses to commands from
the on-board computer, while others required knowledge of the environment or other
hardware components. For example, a GPS simulator needs to know the spacecraft
position in orbit; therefore, this data must be generated dynamically. Simulators requiring
this type of dynamic data utilize a connection to the dynamics software (e.g., “42”
software) to collect the necessary data and then proceed to package the response in the
proper hardware format. The simulated components can be manipulated by the user,
allowing fault testing that typically is not possible or too dangerous to attempt in a
hardware-only test.
NOS3 integrates a set of existing open-source software components and custom
software components to create a fully functional SoST. Figure 47 illustrates how these
software components are interconnected within NOS3.

The following subsections

examine each of these software components and their individual purpose: i.e., NOS
Engine, COSMOS, cFS Flight Software, “42” Dynamics Simulator, Hardware Simulations.

Figure 47. NOS3 component connections between ground (COSMOS),
FSW (cFS), & Dynamics (42)
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One of the primary software components of the NOS3 simulator is the NOS Engine
simulation middleware (previously discussed in Chapter 3.3.5) that abstracts the
hardware and connects the flight software with the simulated dynamics. NOS Engine, as
previously discussed, is an in-house developed software suite that provides a library of
functions to simulate the hardware communication protocols that are utilized by the flight
software.

As discussed in the previous sections, the hardware driver libraries are

replaced with NOS Engine libraries utilizing identical signature function calls. NOS Engine
also supports various underlying protocols such as TCP/IP, inter-process communication
protocol (IPC), and shared memory to transport software bus messages that represent
the actual hardware bus communication. This functionality provides a number of unique
advantages: high-speed communications; shared memory on a single computer running
the flight software and the software simulators; and distributed processing such as TCP/IP
on multiple computers, one running the flight software and others running the software
simulators or interfacing with flight hardware, and other configurations based on
development and testing requirements.
One of the challenges of simulated communications protocols (e.g., UART, I2C, SPI) is
representing their hardware time synchronization clocks within a software-only
environment. Time synchronization clocks are used on small satellites to coordinate
spacecraft time with ground time, coordinate time between various spacecraft
components such as the on-board computer software and the radio frequency
communication component, and provide timing signals for clocks that coordinate
communication using protocols such as I2C and SPI. To overcome such a challenge, the
NOS Engine library contains methods to manipulate and distribute time between various
components that are connected via software busses in place of what would typically be
hardware busses. For example, within NOS3, NOS Engine is utilized to control epochs
and periodic clock signals.
4.3.3 Ground Segment: COSMOS
COSMOS [58] is an open-source command and control software package, and it was
integrated into NOS3 to allow end-to-end testing of STF-1 and to enable the “test as we
fly, fly as we test” philosophy.

COSMOS provides a sophisticated framework for

command and control of satellites and other embedded systems. COSMOS was
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integrated into NOS3 using a collection of text configuration files. A single text file
provides the TCP/IP socket configuration information, while additional text files are autogenerated to define the byte patterns representing telemetry and command data sent
from the spacecraft to the ground and vice versa.
NOS3 includes several COSMOS enhancements to automatically generate and keep the
data descriptions in the embedded code synchronized with the COSMOS command and
telemetry files' data descriptions. Data analysis mechanisms, in addition to what is
provided with COSMOS, were required for the STF-1 mission and have been built as
Ruby language extensions to COSMOS. These extensions are also available in NOS3
and provide some of the post-processing data reduction for STF-1. Despite COSMOS
being already integrated into the NOS3 framework, it should be noted that it is not
architecturally required and could be replaced by a similar command and control software
that supports UDP connection.
4.3.4 Spacecraft Segment: Flight Software: core Flight System (CFS)
The NASA-developed core Flight System [22] is an open-source solution for spacecraft
flight software (first discussed in Chapter 2.1.2), with flight heritage on numerous large
and small NASA missions such as the Global Precipitation Measurement (GPM) and the
Lunar Atmosphere Dust and Environment Explorer (LADEE). The cFS application layer
includes a set of reusable software applications to support flight software development.
The reusable applications are tailored to the mission requirements using tables, while
new applications can also be developed for any mission-specific requirement that is not
directly provided by cFS. The software supports table-driven applications, allowing
applications to be tuned or changed during development and at runtime by merely
changing the tables’ values without changing the codebase. Another cFS component is
a set of common services named the Core Flight Executive layer, that is typically needed
by satellite systems such as timekeeping and timers, executive services for applications,
software bus messaging, and event reporting services. cFS is run on top of a lower level
operating system framework called the Operating System Abstraction Layer, which
isolates embedded software from the real-time operating system by providing users with
an Application Program Interface (API). OSAL libraries are available for a range of
operating systems, including Linux, which allows NOS3 libraries to be substituted at build
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time without any changes to the other cFS’s layers. The Platform Support Package (PSP)
is the cFS component that provides the interface to the hardware drivers for a specific onboard computer. NOS3 is capable of substituting PSP libraries, thus allowing the cFS to
use standard function calls for various protocols (e.g., UART, I2C) to effectively
communicate with the software simulations. The STF-1 mission and, therefore, NOS3
made use of cFS not just for its flight heritage reliability but also for this ability to substitute
libraries that share a common API used by the flight software. It should be noted that it is
architecturally possible to use NOS3 without using cFS and OSAL. If cFS is not used, an
interface library would need to be written to utilize the NOS Engine API.
4.3.5 Flight Dynamics: “42”
A fundamental consideration in developing a small satellite SoST is how to provide
realistic hardware signals reacting to the dynamically changing spacecraft environment.
Specifically, as the spacecraft travels, variables such as its position, velocity, orientation,
solar radiation direction and intensity, magnetic field direction, and intensity change over
time.

While the actual hardware signals corresponding to dynamic inputs can be

determined from hardware data sheets and user's manuals, the dynamic inputs must also
be identified for a correct simulator development.
To provide a complete framework for spacecraft simulation, including the specific
hardware simulations needed for the STF-1 project, a comprehensive analysis was
performed of different dynamic environmental data providers within NOS3. After a
thorough evaluation of numerous external solutions and the possibility of in-house
development options, we chose the “42” software [59] – a general-purpose, multi-body,
multi-spacecraft simulation that provides dynamic environmental data. “42” is an opensource software solution that provides the ability to propagate and predict the orbit and
orientation of spacecraft by computing the forces affecting these orbital parameters,
secondary gravitational effects, aerodynamic drag, solar radiation pressure, magnetic
field interaction, and others.
Several simulators have been developed for the hardware components utilized on STF1, such as the GPS receiver, the antenna deployment system, and the electrical power
system. While these simulators have features specific to the hardware components used
on STF-1, they also present several elements useful to other satellite developers. For
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instance, they provide detailed, practical examples showing how simulators can be written
for hardware components, how to use the NOS Engine communication busses, and how
to receive dynamic data from “42”. Furthermore, NOS3 supplies a common simulation
development framework for adding custom mission simulators; it includes functionalities
for logging and text file configuration of simulators, it facilitates integrating custom mission
capabilities and integrates environmental data providers such as “42”. The framework
also allows the user to create software simulators of a hardware component early in the
mission lifecycle to support flight software development and testing. These simulators can
be written by referencing hardware interface control documents (ICDs) or datasheets and
further augmented with characteristic data from the hardware when available.
4.3.6 NOS3 Hardware Simulator Architecture Design
The three-piece architecture described below is a generic way to design the individual
simulators utilized in NOS3. Having a common architecture across NOS3 simulators
assists with future simulator integration and maintenance. The architecture of the NOS3
core software components dictates that a simulator only connects to the LibA3200NOS
library, which is a C library containing specific board drivers. The NOS3 architecture uses
a single NOS Engine Server. This server creates a single bus and provides a transport
for each node to connect to.

The FSW is represented by a single node and this

connection is made by the LibA3200NOS library. Each simulator is then another node
on the single bus and is only responsible for receiving messages with data that is the
bytes that the flight software would send to the hardware and for sending messages with
data that is the bytes that the hardware would send to the FSW.
A simulator can be architected in three pieces. The first piece, the “Simulator” block below
in Figure 48, represents the transfer of data to and from NOS engine. The last piece,
“Environment Data Provider,” represents the actual physical world that is being simulated
and can respond to a request for data at a particular real-world time with data that the
sensor would return at that real-world time.

The middle piece, “Hardware Model,”

represents any hardware-specific processing of the data: the unpacking and parsing of
the data from the flight software, the translation of that data into commands and state
changes to the hardware, the request to the real physical world simulation at a particular
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time and receipt of the response, and the packing of any hardware state or physical world
data for the transmission of data to the flight software via NOS Engine.

Figure 48. NOS3 Simulator Architecture

4.3.7 NOS3 and Flight Software Architecture Design
The flight software interacts with the simulators through the NOS3 architecture. This
architecture is embedded into the Hardware Library (HWLib), as shown in Figure 49.
NOS Engine is utilized to simulate different communications protocols and buses to allow
communication between the flight software and the simulated or actual hardware. This
middle layer, composed of the HWLib and libA3200/libGomspace (shown with the red
border), allows for the logging, monitoring, and manipulation of the data, which enables
additional tests to be performed on the flight software and the rerouting of the data to the
simulators.

Figure 49. NOS3 Architecture Overview
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The HWLib connects all of the flight software CFS applications with the hardware or the
simulator depending upon if it is linked with the LibA3200 or LibA3200NOS library. This
allows for quick swapping between a simulator environment and a real hardware
environment. Also, the simulator environment can be a SoST environment or a hardwarein-the-loop simulator environment. As mentioned in previous sections, the flight software
is not changed, allowing the “test as you fly and fly as you test” mantra to remain valid.
The library is simply changed to redirect hardware calls to the middleware. This logic can
be visualized in Figure 50Error! Reference source not found.. Additional connectors f
or other platforms can be written to allow for communication through NOS3.

Figure 50. FSW Compiler Diagram
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4.3.8 Ready-To-Run Deployment and Operations
The NOS3 collection of software components are conveniently packaged as a readyto-run virtual machine, reducing the overhead associated with installing and configuring
each software component. NOS3 can be distributed as an Oracle VirtualBox virtual
machine image or as a collection of command scripts that are used to recreate and modify
a virtual machine image.

As discussed in Chapter 3.5, users have a common

development and testing environment, further reducing risk to the mission. The standard
guest operating system utilized by NOS3 is Ubuntu Linux, but the virtual machine can run
using Oracle VirtualBox on Windows, Mac, or Linux computers.

5 Engineering Roadmap for Scoping, Designing, and Implementing a
SoST
To date, the processes for scoping, designing, implementing, and deploying SoSTs are
immature and unknown to engineers and their management, which can often lead to
misconceptions, confusion, and project failure, as personally witnessed at other
organizations by this author.

SoSTs do not necessarily follow typical software

engineering project lifecycles, and their development can become over budget with a late
schedule, resulting in project failures. Also, anecdotal evidence witnessed by this author
over the past several years suggests that when budgets shrink and schedules slip, the
result is less organizational testing and less organizational support for simulator and
emulator development, thus moving back to the traditional paradigm of testing on the
“scarce space hardware resources” because it is on the critical path. This research
provides a roadmap and implementation tips for both engineers and managers to develop
and deploy a SoST successfully. Please note that SoST development is an extremely
challenging process that often involves source-level debugging, specific knowledge of
hardware systems, and reverse engineering.

Having the correctly skilled staff of

engineers is extremely important.
The

following

subsections

list

commonly

encountered

pitfalls

and

technical

implementation advice on specific SoST development topics:
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5.1 Beginning SoST Design and Implementation
5.1.1 For newly developed custom hardware, do not begin SoST implementation until the flight
software has executed on a hardware test bed
For spacecraft with newly developed custom hardware, beginning SoST
implementation before a hardware test bed is available is not recommended. It is perfectly
acceptable to perform the SoST scoping and design, but the implementation should be
deferred until there is at least baseline flight software functionality that has been
successfully executed on the hardware test bed in order to help pinpoint modeling
inaccuracies. For “product-line” hardware with minimal changes, SoST development can
begin early in the lifecycle process.
Implementing the SoST before it has been at least executed once on a test bed is a tricky
situation that can significantly hinder SoST development and must be managed carefully.
There is a tendency to begin SoST develop and follow the flight software development
lifecycle in parallel. On the surface, this would appear to be the correct approach;
however, the better approach is to carefully follow the hardware test bed development
schedule. Because the SoST models hardware and the flight software needs to execute
on hardware, then the SoST development should follow the hardware test bed lifecycle.
Hardware documentation often lacks the detail needed to complete the hardware models,
and the flight software is required to understand better how the hardware behaves. This
approach's problem is that the flight software may not be mature enough to execute on
the hardware, thus leaving the modeling efforts in an ambiguous state. The result is
incomplete hardware models that leave the developer to determine if the flight software
is the problem or the hardware models are the problem, with usually both being incorrect,
thus causing complicated (i.e., time-consuming) issues to resolve.
5.1.2 Treat the Ground Segment system software as a black box for SoST integration
The Ground Software System, regardless of which software is utilized, should be treated
mostly as a black box by the SoST designer. The Ground Software System needs to be
integrated, most likely by TCP/IP socket communications, but otherwise should be treated
as a black box installed in its own virtual machine. Dedicate an engineer at from 50% to
100% of their time to learning and becoming an “expert user” of the ground system
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software. Often, this software is complicated, legacy, and it is not readily apparent what
pieces of the software are essential to the SoST operations.
5.1.3 The Modeling Process Itself is a New Type of V&V and Should Be Embraced
Often overlooked, the SoST modeling process itself is a new type of V&V that should be
considered by the organization as part of the V&V formalized process. For example,
during the modeling development phases, the flight software is executed in the SoST
against an incomplete model.

The incomplete model also represents a hardware

component that is malfunctioning or failing and causes the flight software to execute its
fault-logic paths that are seldom (if ever) tested and categorized as flight software Fault
Detection and Response functionality. Flight software errors can be uncovered during
this process, thus demonstrating the amount of robustness that has been engineered into
the flight software.
5.1.4 Determine the Source of the Spacecraft Dynamics Component Early
The Spacecraft Dynamics component is one of the most important and challenging
components of a SoST and should be scoped and designed early in the development
process. Development of the Dynamics component can take the longest time. Thus, it
needs to determine whether the Dynamics component will be developed by the same
SoST development team, contracted out to another organization, or provided by another
organization for integration. Often in large missions, a Dynamic’s component does
exist but needs considerable effort to convert it from a typical hardware-in-the-loop
component to a software-only component. This process can involve significant
software development, often at lower-level interfaces, in order to properly abstract
the hardware interfaces.
5.1.5 Follow the Iterative Development Processes to Reduce Risk
Chapter 3.1 and Chapter 3.2 introduced and discussed the iterative development process
to follow for SoSTs, and how it differs from traditional software development processes.
Iterative development processes should be utilized for SoSTs, and customers’
expectations need carefully managed, and each iteration’s new functionality and features
need carefully communicated. Usually, the SoST development follows (or slightly lags)
the flight software development schedule.
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5.1.6 Choose the Instruction Set Simulator Carefully and Early
Before beginning SoST design, considerable thought needs to be given to which
Instruction Set Simulator to utilize, which often requires a market survey. The obvious
starting point is first to choose ISSs that support the target architecture; the next step is
to evaluate each ISS while asking the following questions:
•

Does the ISS support speed caching or instruction pattern matching? ISSs can
often speed up execution by matching instructions to other host instructions to
speed up performance. The details are specific to each architecture, but one
example is that PowerPC NoOps (no-operational-instructions) can be skipped by
the ISS to speed up execution in the synchronous SoST.

•

Does the ISS support software integration? While not easily determined, an
analysis must be performed to determine if the ISS supports third party software
development and integration.

Some ISSs simply offer CPU virtualization for

executing simple binaries; however, for SoSTs (and their complexity), an ISS that
supports the integration of other software components (such as NOS Engine) is a
requirement.

Evaluate the ISS’s application programmer’s interface (API) or

software development kit (SDK).
•

The ease of model development of hardware components is crucial for ISS
consideration.

Some ISSs support model development, while others do not.

Similar to the previous bullet, an analysis of the ISS’s capabilities is needed.

5.2 SoST Hardware Modeling Best Practices
5.2.1 Choosing Appropriate Levels of Fidelity – Only Model What You Need
It is important to be able to choose the appropriate level of SoST fidelity and then only
model the functionality that is required. While this is an obvious statement, the details of
choosing the fidelity and modeling only needed functionality can be challenging to
ascertain. Let the flight software and its functionality guide you in the SoST’s iterative
design of functionality per release.
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5.2.2 Document SoST Model Limitations and Capabilities for Each Release
For each SoST release, plan to utilize an issue tracking system to record the model
limitations. Ensuring that model limitations and functionality is documented is extremely
helpful for internal scoping and planning while also helping to communicate to users the
current capabilities of the SoST. Users need to be aware of any SoST limitations so that
they can plan their testing/V&V activities accordingly.
5.2.3 SoST Verification Is Time Consuming and Should Be Planned for Appropriately
SoST development managers need to recognize that the verification activity for each
iteration will be extremely time consuming and must be managed carefully to avoid a
pitfall of technical churn.

The SoST verification process will vary for each specific

mission’s SoST, but overall, a detailed plan needs to be generated and followed closely
while avoiding activities and problem-solving that could degenerate into compounded
issues. Please note that the tests to certify/verify a SoST are NOT simple unit tests with
a quickly determined PASS/FAIL criteria; instead, these are considered integration tests
by the mission and are often complex functional scenarios that even by themselves can
be difficult to configure and execute. Inevitably, results from the mission’s tests and the
SoST’s tests will not match, and significant engineering skills are required to determine
which platform has the correct results given a direct comparison of two platforms. Original
time estimates for this activity should be at least doubled to account for issues that arise.
5.2.4 Avoid Periodic Event Modeling to Significantly Increase Performance
Periodic events are defined as hardware events that occur regularly at a specific period.
Often, periodic events are real-time interrupts that are driven by an oscillator or timed
events that occur on a schedule. When modeling, the periodicity should not be modeled
due to performance; instead, their effects should be modeled based upon their CPU time
when visible to the flight software. For example, if a spacecraft time register records
elapsed time in seconds and nanoseconds, then do not model the register like its realworld incrementing behavior. The registers should be modeled such that whenever the
flight software reads the registers then, and only then are the register values calculated
to return the correct values to the flight software. Please note that because SoSTs are
synchronous, it is acceptable to perform calculations and other operations when registers
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are read. There is no issue with the flight software having to “wait” for the register to be
ready-for-reading. This on-demand modeling technique considerably increases SoST
performance and helps it execute faster than real-time.
5.2.5 Considerations for Simulation Speed and Operating Faster Than Real-Time
To help the SoST execute as fast as possible, including faster than real-time, the models
should react immediately to events and data and ignore the real-world time it would take
to fulfill the transaction.

For example, MIL-STD-1553 transactions can take 10

microseconds to 16 microseconds to complete in the real world; instead of having the
model wait this exact time, batch complete several MIL-STD-1553 transactions. This
technique helps to ensure that the models execute faster than real-time. Occasionally,
the flight software requires some delay as it is not designed to operate in “instantaneous
time”. When this occurs, insert the minimum delay necessary into the models.

6 SoST Verification Analysis, Problem Statement Review, and Benefits
Realized
6.1 Methods of SoST Verification and Analysis
“How do you verify your models?” is the most commonly asked question this author
receives at all SoST presentations, demonstrations, and user meetings. The question is
so common that a presentation slide is always prepared in advance with the explanation
and results provided to the audience. The explanation and results have several aspects
to them, which are described in detail below, sans the PowerPoint slides. The verification
methods are similar between Flagship mission SoSTs and SmallSat SoSTs. There are
several minor differences in approaches, and their nuances are explained. Specific
mission SoST verification approaches, analysis, and results are presented.
The goal of SoST verification is to ensure that the developed models accurately represent
their hardware counterparts and that their integration and timing considerations also
accurately allow the flight software to execute in a flight-like environment.
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6.1.1 Method 1: Utilization of Hardware Test Procedures as Verification Methods
This primary verification method serves as the “Zemerick Gold Rule” for SoST verification
[60]: Execute all original hardware test procedures and obtain the same results as the
physical system. The only exception to this rule is that settling time for signals may need
to be extended if the SoST is executing slower than real-time. An example is provided
below.
This verification method utilizes the missions’ test and Run-For-Record procedures
executed on the hardware test beds to verify the flight software. The SoST verification
approach is to execute the same tests on the SoST and then analyze the results to verify
that the SoST behavior matches the hardware test bed behavior.

The exact flight

software version is utilized for both sets of tests to ensure a common baseline of behavior
and allow for a direct comparison.
Each SoST has its own unique set of hardware models because each mission has its
own set of unique hardware. For this reason, there is no single set of SoST verification
acceptance tests; instead, each SoST must be verified using unique mission test
procedures that represent a significant mission testing milestone, such as Run-ForRecord. Also noteworthy, these test procedures are often very complex and require hours
and sometimes days to execute, resulting in significant labor needed for SoST
verification, especially when test results show differences. Integration of the Ground
Segment/Software System (as previously discussed in Chapter 2.1) is critical for SoST
verification due to the re-use and “borrowing” of the mission’s hardware tests. These
tests are designed to run in one single way, using a very specific ground station software
configuration. Since the SoST includes the Ground Segment, the tests are ready-to-run
and do not need to be rewritten for another configuration, platform, or architecture.
Exhaustive lists of specific SoST test cases are not necessary to detail here because
each mission is different; instead, one test case with various for the specific JIST SoST
is described to provide the reader with the process and context needed to understand
SoST verification.
Please note that the Predicted and Raw FlatSat values from the following
comparison plots were obtained from an integration lab similar to that shown in
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Figure 51. The integration lab (i.e., FlatSat) contains flight hardware that is being
tested for final integration.

Figure 51. JWST undergoing testing and integration.
Image Courtesy Northrop Grumman

A specific Attitude Control System (ACS) test (named ACS10) is a crucial pointingrequirements test for the JWST observatory. The test's goal is to ensure that the JWST
observatory can perform a slew maneuver (large) and issue a fine guidance (small
pointing) maneuver, all while ensuring that the solar panels and instruments are always
pointed away from the sun.

ACS10 is a complex test that requires approximately sixty

minutes to execute and requires the JWST
ground station software to execute. ACS10 is
a

long

series

of

scripts

that

contain

commands, waits, telemetry checks, and flight
software upload actions. Figure 52 shows an
experimental visualization of the spacecraft
that enables a SoST user to visualize the
spacecraft’s maneuvers as the ACS10 test

Figure 52. Visualization of the JWST Spacecraft
During Verification Tests
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case executes. A user can visually watch the spacecraft for jitter, pointing direction, and
maneuver speeds; even though visual verification cannot be performed alone without
data analysis, it gives the user important information about the spacecraft state in realtime, remarkably similar to the actual spacecraft operations.
The order of events for running ACS10 on the JIST SoST is to:
1) Verify that the correct flight software-under-test is loaded onto the JIST SoST, then
2) run JIST such that the flight software and spacecraft is in a nominal state
3) Load the test files/scripts to the ground station software and
4) Begin the test execution.
The ACS10 test “believes” that it operates in a hardware test lab with a FlatSat
configuration when in reality, it is executing in a completely software-only environment.
Once a test is finished executing, various telemetry points are compared between the
SoST test run and the Hardware Test Bed run. Many telemetry points are usually
compared in various ways, such as importing data into Microsoft Excel for data analysis
and comparison.
Figures 53 and 54 (below) show one such comparison for the Gyro A/B components of
the Inertial Rate Unit (IRU) for the JWST spacecraft. The IRU is critical for JWST
observatory pointing, and it must perform accurately in a closed-loop control scheme. The
left side of Figure 53 and Figure 54 show the raw value response of the gyro, while the
graphs on the right show the JIST-generated raw value response of the gyro. The
responses are a match indicating that the JIST gyro behavior matches the behavior of the
Hardware Test Bed during ACS10 execution. Upon closer inspection, the JIST plot
indicates that the settling of the gyro took longer (referring to the x-axis), even though the
response behavior was identical. This was due to the JIST instruction-set-simulator
running slightly slower than real-time, whereas the ground software system runs the test
and logs data in real-wall-clock-time.
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Figure 54. IRU Rate A Component Comparison Between FlatSat and JIST

Figure 53. IRU Rate B Component Comparison Between FlatSat and JIST
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Figure 55 is a different plot showing a comparison between the FlatSat (left plot) and JIST
(right plot) of the Fine Sensor 1 Y-Coordinates. Notice that the response for the Sun
Sensor matches between the FlatSat and JIST with the exception that the JIST graph
finishes sooner at approximately 2700 seconds while the FlatSat graph finishes at 3000+
seconds. This difference results from JIST running faster than real-time and thus able to
complete the test in faster wall-clock time; this is a unique characteristic of SoSTs.

Figure 55. Sun Sensor 1 Y Component FlatSat and JIST Comparison

Figure 56 (below) illustrates the results of a test showing the comparison of the sun sensor
pitch angle response with the JIST results shown on the right. Also, note that JIST
completes approximately 250 seconds sooner, thus indicating that JIST is running faster
than real-time, which is a significant advantage for SoSTs.
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Figure 56. Comparison of FlatSat and JIST Sun Pitch Angle

Inevitably, the tests will not match at some point during the process, and a detailed
analysis will need to be performed to determine the root cause of the problem. When this
occurs, there is no silver-bullet-quick solution; a detailed engineering analysis needs to
be performed that will touch aspects of the spacecraft control engineering, test
engineering, flight software, and the hardware models. It is often beneficial to create a
small team to collaborate on the issue, as various engineering skills will be required. The
chances are good that the SoST models are incorrect or different from the hardware
components, but identifying the differences, which are often related to timing, can be
challenging.
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6.1.2 Method 2: Utilization of Hardware Checkout Tests as Verification Methods
This Method #2 of verifying a SoST is more subtle and often overlooked, because
missions have separate teams that develop the flight software and the flight hardware.
The two teams naturally have integration points, but in general, the hardware team
develops the functionality, and the flight software team is responsible for using the
hardware correctly.

However, the hardware team will often have simple checkout

software tests, sometimes referred to as Built in Self Tests (BISTs), that execute
functional unit tests against the hardware to ensure functionality is operational and that
logic in the FPGAs is implemented correctly. For example, as shown in Figure 57, most
custom space hardware has FPGAs with well-defined behavior for its registers, DMA, etc.
These checkout software tests provide the inputs to the FPGAs and ensure that the logic
output is expected compared with the hardware FPGA specification. These tests can
become valuable verification tools for SoSTs
because they can execute on the flight
computer model against the SoST hardware
models. If the tests do not pass or the test
results do not match the hardware test results,
then there are apparent model discrepancies
that need to be resolved. This Method #2 can
be a more efficient verification method than
#1, because the test software in Method #2 is

Figure 57. Hardware Checkout Tests for FPGAs

more straightforward with only input/outputs being executed and tested.

This is

analogous to unit testing in standard software engineering practices.
This method was utilized on JIST for the instrument RAD750 flight computer and a custom
JWST cPCI card, but the tests and results cannot be included here. The tests uncovered
several minor hardware modeling bugs that were resolved quickly in the custom cPCI
card model.
6.1.3 Method 3: SmallSat SoST Model Verification Examples for NOS3
SmallSat SoST verification methods can be similar to Method #1 and Method #2
previously discussed. However, since SmallSats are inherently different mission-types
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with different development processes, lower-cost and less-custom (more COTS)
hardware, and shorter schedules, SoST verification can sometimes be more targeted with
an immediate focus on the hardware models and simulators and a direct comparison with
the actual hardware.
For all the models listed below, the SmallSat hardware itself was utilized for verification.
In most cases, the simulator was developed from documentation well in advance of the
hardware delivery. Once the hardware arrived, the models’ behavior was compared with
the model to ensure accuracy.
In Table 9 are hardware models, the specific NOS3 simulator name, the verification
method utilized, and relevant results.
Table 9. NOS3 / SoST Hardware Model Verification

Hardware
FOTON GPS

Honeywell
HMC5843
Magnetometer

NOS3
Simulator
GPS Sim

MAG Sim

Clydespace Gen III
Electrical Power
System

EPS Sim

Arducam OV2640
Camera

CAM Sim

Verification Method

Results

Serial data dumps recorded from the FOTON
hardware were read through the CFS application for
GPS to ensure proper decoding and data integrity.
The results from the hardware and simulation were
compared to validate the GPSSim.
Because 42 is the source of the Earth’s magnetic field
model for NOS3’s MagSim, validation of this sim is
basically a validation of the model used in 42. The
plan is to validate this simulator by obtaining onorbit magnetic field data and comparing it with the
MagSim data.

Sim matches FOTON GPS. No
issue swapping between
simulator and hardware.

A rough comparison will be possible by comparing
the hardware readings with a cell phone
magnetometer and then comparing that with 42’s
model. This will also validate the translation of the
data from values in nanoteslas to the format and
units that FSW expects.
The EPS hardware was used for telemetry, and
switch commanding, and its behavior will be
compared with the EPS Sim, which was developed
well in advance of the hardware delivery.

The CAM Sim was updated to provide similar
performance (namely picture acquisition time) and
similar image size as to the actual OV2640
hardware.

Still in progress. A more
detailed analysis of on-orbit
magnetometer data needs
to be performed.

EPS Sim allowed flight
software development and
testing to remain on
schedule even while the EPS
hardware was continually
delayed.
CAM Sim was utilized when
few cameras were available.
The CAM Sim was utilized
for flight software testing
and development,
specifically in support of
performance testing.
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Hardware
InvenSense MPU3200 3-Axis
Gyroscope
Cadet Radio

NOS3
Simulator
Gyro Sim

Cadet Sim

Temperature
Sensors

Temp Sim

Sun Sensors

Sun Sim

Verification Method

Results

Similar to the magnetometer, the output ranges of
the gyro can be compared with the output ranges of
the simulator. Full-scale ranges were verified and
compared.
Testing with the actual Cadet radio was needed to
better understand its behavior in order to properly
model the Cadet radio.

Still in progress. A more
detailed analysis of on-orbit
gyro data needs to be
performed.
Cadet Sim behavior was
matched with the actual
radio.

Temperature simulators were validated by ensuring
that the simulator provided the correct modeled
resolution, accuracy, and scale ranges as the
temperature sensors used on STF-1.
A sun sensor model was validated by testing the
characteristics of hardware light sensors and then
making appropriate sensor model modifications.

CadetSim was extremely
valuable because the radio is
a “scarce resource.”
Simple
simulator
was
verified with the actual
temperature sensors.
Simple
simulator
was
verified with the actual light
sensors.

6.2 Problem Statement Review and Benefits Realized
This chapter aims to review the Problem Statements and provide additional technical and
nontechnical supporting evidence as to the resolution of the problem statements by
utilizing SoSTs. This chapter focuses on the benefits of developing, deploying and
utilizing SoST for spacecraft and SmallSat missions. This chapter does not redefine the
Problem Statements; for information on the Problem Statements refer to Chapter 1.
6.2.1 Problem Statement 1: Limited Hardware Test Bed Resources Due to Custom Hardware
Results in a Lack of V&V
The JIST SoST is the software-only equivalent of a considerable amount of hardware in
a physical test bed laboratory. Each JWST test bed costs at least $1,000,000 (see Table
10 below for component prices excluding labor) and is in limited quantity and impossible
for smaller organizations to procure. This limitation of hardware causes extremely tight
V&V schedules due to laboratory overutilization. For a cost comparison, each SoST
deployment costs approximately $10,400 in software licensing costs (excluding labor
development SoST costs), making SoSTs extremely affordable and deployable. For each
hardware component in the table, the JIST SoST must emulate and abstract the hardware
by utilizing models. Also, note that this hardware includes custom cPCI cards that require
significant lead times and are manufactured in small quantities.
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Table 10. SoST Compared with Hardware Equivalent Test Bed
Item

Quantity

6U RAD750 SBC with SpaceWire and
1553 (Prototype Board)

4

Unit Cost
$193,000

$772,000

BAE Quote 12-049

JWST Peripheral Interface Module
(JPIM) Card

2

Unknown

Unknown

Contractor Proprietary Card

Custom cCPI Cards (BIC, FPAPs, HK,
CMM-S, CMM-Ka, SIM)

12

$7,500

$90,000.00

Estimated average cost of custom cPCI
cards

VDS Hardware (dSPACE)

1

$50,856

$50,826.00

dSPACE Quote: QUI-0938105

VDS Software (dSpace)

1

$32,880

$32,880.00

dSPACE Quote: QUI-0938104

TCTS and MTTS Support Hardware

1

$40,000

$40,000.00

SpaceWire Test Set (SWTS)

1

$17,639.00

$17,639.00

Two hardware racks, including RTLogic
T501 Front End Processor Cost, etc.
Microtel LLC: 071211-1

SpaceWire Cables

2

$535.00

$1,070.00

Microtel LLC: 071211-1

MIL-STD-1553 Cables

4

$58.20

$232.80

MilesTek 1553 Cables

cPCI Chassis

4

$3,610.00

$14,440.00

Tracewell Quote 012131-00

JIST HARDWARE-EQUIVALENT COST

Total Cost

Reference

$1,019,087.80

6.2.2 Problem Statement 2: Limited Fault Injection Capabilities for Thorough Flight Software
Testing

capabilities, particularly in data bus
transfers

where

overwritten
execution.

values

dynamically

can

be

during

For missions with limited

hardware test beds, the ability to deploy
SoSTs directly increases the amount of
V&V and fault injection testing that can
be performed.

# Test Environments

SoSTs have enormous fault injection

JIST Increases Test
Resources
16

4
PRE-JIST (HW
SOLUTION)

JIST

Deployments
As shown in Figure 58, for JIST, the
JWST mission had four hardware test

Figure 58. JIST Increases Test Resources
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beds, but deploying JIST in strategic

JIST Increases Access to
Test Resources

areas increased the deployments to
sixteen, thus resulting in a significant
increase in testing environments and
V&V

opportunities.

Similarly, as shown in Figure 59, this
had a significant increase in the
number of testers, increasing from
twenty-four users to ninety-six users
once JIST was deployed. More test
resources and more testers directly
benefit and increase the mission’s

96

# Users

fault-injection

24
PRE-JIST (HW
SOLUTION)

JIST
Users

Figure 59. JIST Increases Access to Test Resources

software assurance.
6.2.3 Problem Statement 3: Limited / Nonexistent Flight Software V&V Methods for SmallSats
and CubeSats
•

Results: NOS3 SoST Impact on STF-1 Flight Software Development

As a metric to assess the overall software complexity, the Source-Lines-of-Code (SLOC)
utility (SLOCCount) was executed against the source code. SLOCCount estimates that
the STF-1 applications take 8.25 person-months for development. However, this metric
does not consider unit testing, integration testing, and access to flight hardware for
testing, which are typically the bottlenecks for small satellites and space missions.
Operationally, the STF-1 flight software is not trivial due to its semi-autonomous on-orbit
functionalities that are needed to perform science experiments, record science data, and
transmit the data to the ground station during downlink periods of just a few minutes long.
The flight software must be able to simultaneously provide the following core
functionalities: 1) operate without interaction/commanding from the ground station; 2) it
must be aware of its power level status for executing time-lapse science experiments; 3)
it must start, stop, and pause experiments; 4) it is responsible for communicating with
various STF-1 hardware components such as sensors, radio, camera, and the deployable
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antenna. This flight software complexity results in increased mission-risk with respect to
development and testing schedule.
Table 11. STF-1 Flight Software SLOC Counts of the Newly Developed Software.

Software Component

Description

Source Lines of
Code (SLOC)

Core Flight System (CFS) +
Platform Support Package
(PSP)

GSFC reusable
flight software framework

50 K + 7 K

Operating System
Abstraction Layer (OSAL)

GSFC reusable operating system
abstraction layer API

41K

Newly developed
flight software

34K

STF-1 Mission Specific
Applications
TOTAL

•

132K

Reduced Hardware Reliance

The NOS3 SoST enabled multiple STF-1 developers to work in parallel without
monopolizing either a single simulator, engineering test unit, or spacecraft flight computer,
thus reducing the STF-1 mission’s reliance on hardware. For example, while one engineer
was developing the electrical power system software, another engineer developed the
communications software. Neither engineer needed to utilize the hardware for their
development and initial testing.
NOS3 was utilized extensively by the STF-1 software development team for all aspects
of flight software development and testing. Over the course of three person-months in
which most of STF-1 software development was accomplished, each team member
maintained their own NOS3 virtual environment.

The virtual environment provided

realistic inputs and feedback to the flight software while under development.
Additionally, NOS3 provided a suitable test environment to support STF-1 flight software
integration testing. Similar to many other small satellite missions, the STF-1 mission
hardware was expensive, limited in supply with few spares, and it needed to be configured
and setup quickly to support testing. NOS3 provided the ability to develop and test most
flight software functionality without requiring a hardware-in-the-loop test configuration.
Hardware is still needed to test specific performance and timing requirements. Without
NOS3, STF-1 developers would not have been able to develop and test software
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applications in parallel to these activities. As a result, it would have been challenging to
maintain the flight software development and test schedule.
•

Reduced Risk and Provided a Living Training Package

The effortless deployment process of the NOS3 software allowed us to set up and
configure a large number of medium-fidelity simulation environments to cross-train
personnel and support risk reduction testing during the STF-1 software development. For
example, NOS3 was provided to multiple interns during the summer months to support
mission understanding, static analyses, and additional software testing of custom STF-1
software applications. The additional simulation resources allowed the team to test how
the various STF-1 software applications would respond to adverse conditions, thus
ensuring STF-1 software robustness.

One of the most critical STF-1 software

applications, the Manager Application, which is responsible for semi-automating the
spacecraft operations, was exhaustively tested using NOS3. NOS3 also allows the tester
to introduce fault conditions that are too dangerous or expensive to test using hardware,
which further reduced mission risk and raised confidence in the flight software.
•

Improved the Software Development Schedule

NOS3 was able to increase the STF-1 development team’s control of the software
development schedule and demonstrate how future software development effort
schedules can be shifted ahead of hardware components' receipt. Table 12 reports the
lead times associated with the major STF-1 flight components as compared with the
associated development time for the NOS3 hardware simulator. It is evident that the level
of effort required to develop a hardware-equivalent simulator for the STF-1 mission with
NOS3 was rather minimal. Furthermore, a NOS3 hardware simulator can be scoped,
planned (effort, simulator fidelity, etc.), and efforted, whereas hardware lead times from
vendors change and slip regularly. NOS3 allowed STF-1 software development to begin
as scheduled versus when the hardware arrived.
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Table 12. STF-1 component lead time compared to NOS3 software simulator development time.
By reducing lead time, flight software development can start earlier in the mission.

Hardware Component

STF-1 Hardware
Procurement Lead Time

NOS3 Simulation
Development Time

Antenna Deployment System

6 Months

2 Weeks

Electrical Power System (EPS)

10 Months

3 Weeks

GPS Receiver

2 Weeks

2 Weeks

Magnetometer

6 Months

1 Week

UHF Radio

7 Months

1 Month

12+ Months

1 Week

Experimental Payload

•

SoST Application to CubeSat/SmallSat Problem Statements

The primary purpose of the STF-1 CubeSat mission was to develop a software-only
simulation framework and supporting tools that would support STF-1 as well as support
future small satellite missions. The resulting byproduct of STF-1 is an open-source
software environment named NOS3. The NOS3 architecture was designed to be flexible
and allow multiple configuration and deployment options. NOS3 conveniently packages
a set of open-source tools (cFS, COSMOS, and “42” dynamics simulator) and a set of
STF-1 specific hardware simulators to provide a virtual spacecraft environment that is
easy to configure and deploy to end-users. NOS3 has demonstrated its extreme value
to the STF-1 mission by reducing hardware reliance, increasing available test resources,
serving as a training and risk reduction platform, enabling parallel software development
activities that shorten cycles, reducing developer costs, and alleviating schedule
pressures due to slips in hardware component deliveries.
6.2.4 Problem Statement #4: COVID-19 Situation Limits Hardware Testing Causing Schedule
Delays
Although somewhat difficult to quantity at this time, the COVID-19 pandemic (ongoing)
has caused significant schedule delays across many organizations, especially those
requiring hands-on laboratory integration efforts. In many cases, SoSTs are the only
available option for engineers for flight software development, V&V and testing, and
deployment. The COVID-19 pandemic has increased the demand for SoSTs due to their
flexibility and availability. COVID-19 has provided the opportunity to demonstrate that
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SoSTs are an essential tool that can be effectively and efficiently deployed alongside
hardware FlatSat test beds.
6.2.5 Problem Statement #5: Limited Testing Venues of
Embedded Non-X86 Flight Software
As shown in Figure 60, utilization of the JIST SoST
unexpectedly increased significantly outside of the
NASA IV&V Program to other venues. For example,
44% of JIST utilization was for JWST Mission
Operations, and 33% of the usage was from the JWST
Spacecraft Mission contractor-developer. The Mission
Operations and Spacecraft Developer utilization was
not expected; utilization by JIST expanded to other usecases once organizations realized the benefits of the

Figure 60. JIST Utilization by Organization

JIST SoST for developer, mission operations, and also
cybersecurity.
6.2.6 Problem Statement #6: Lack of Virtualization Technologies
The SoST collection of software components is conveniently packaged as an automated
ready-to-run virtual machine, reducing the overhead associated with installing and
configuring each software component. Each SoST can be distributed as an Oracle
VirtualBox virtual machine image or as a collection of command scripts that are used to
recreate and modify a virtual machine image. This allows users to have a common
development and testing environment, further reducing risk to the mission. Figure 61
compares the JIST deployment time with that of its equivalent hardware.

Figure 61. JIST Deployment Time Compared with Hardware Deployment Time
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6.2.7 Problem Statement #7: Flight Hardware Driver and Software Interfaces are Tightly
Coupled
Having highly coupled software modules is a well-documented software engineering
criticism. Low coupling and high cohesion between software modules are always desired.
However, the layer between the flight software (application layer) and its hardware drivers
are often tightly coupled. The reason for this is that the flight software must at some point
in its design, interact with the real-world, and that means directly controlling hardware or
receiving its telemetry over a standard bus interface. SoSTs address this problem in their
design in two ways:
1. A hybrid architecture of software-only and hardware-in-the-loop can be utilized to

help break the coupling, ensuring a more flexible flight software build system.
Hybrid SoSTs that include hardware-in-the-loop are discussed more in Chapter
7.2.1.
2. Advanced SoSTs address this problem now by designing a software module
known as a Mock Hardware Interface (MHI) (author-invented definition) that sits
between the flight software (application layer) and the driver interface. The MHI is
responsible for duplicating the hardware driver interface in its design but also being
able to interface to other SoST components. For this to operate correctly, the MHI
must be aware of the SoSTs virtual time synchronization.

6.3 Direct Benefits: Metrics for Flight Software Issues Identified During SoST Dynamic
Analysis
The IV&V Program maintains a database of flight software issues identified, their severity,
and their disposition once reported to the mission’s flight software development team. To
date, eighty-one (81) flight software issues have been identified across twelve (12) NASA
projects. Of those 81 issues, 5 are considered a Severity Level 1, indicating that if they
were to occur, they would result in loss-of-mission. Please note that these flight software
issues are not simple bugs; SoSTs’ usage is designed to find the “big problems.” To
provide context below is explanation text from two Severity Level 1 issues:
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•

Violation of Red Safety Limit if IMU Outage Occurs During Autonomous Momentum
Dump

•

Software Crash During Flight Phases Does Not Issue a Critical Software Abort

The primary goal of SoSTs is to enable advanced V&V activities so that flight software
issues and defects can be identified earlier in the software development lifecycle and to
catch the mission-ending flight software issues. Below are descriptions of actual highseverity flight software issues identified by utilizing an SoST. The list below does not
include all issues identified; instead, the list describes the highest severity issues that if
they were to occur, would result in possible mission loss. Details are changed/removed
because of both mission sensitivities and ITAR/export control considerations.
6.3.1 Defect Identified 1: Mission-Ending Issue That Escaped Initial Flight Software Verification
Tests
During SoST development for a specific mission it was discovered that a software data
validity flag for a specific hardware component was set incorrectly in software to
“INVALID” per documentation. However, the flight software was processing the data as
if it were “VALID” and would continue utilizing the data from the hardware component, not
realizing that the data was “NOT VALID.” The problem was traced to a mission simulator
used for the flight software requirements, design, source code development, and tests
instead of the using the documentation as the correct reference. Had this issue not been
discovered before launch, it would have resulted in a mission-ending software fault.
6.3.2 Defect Identified 2: Issues Identified in the Board Support Package (BSP) Hardware Driver
Software Due to Simulated Hardware Failures
During SoST development for a different mission, several significant issues were
identified in the board support package (BSP), which contains the hardware driver
software. All of the issues were related to interrupt and timing and could only be exposed
in a software-only environment where fault-injection can be performed, and timing is
analyzed in lock-step detail. The issues could not be tested on actual hardware due to
the various faults needed to be injected into the hardware, which is not feasible. The root
causes of the issues were centered around invalid software states that would occur if
hardware failures were to happen.
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BSPs and hardware drivers represent pieces of software that are the most difficult to test.
Often, BSPs are considered vendor-supplied (e.g., COTS) and do not undergo extensive
verification and validation. SoSTs are the perfect tool to helping ensure that BSPs and
hardware drivers will perform correctly after the launch of a spacecraft.
6.3.3 Defect Identified 3: Radio Configuration Not Set Correctly Due to Invalid Register Writes
On a different mission than those described in Defect #1 and Defect #2, it was discovered
during SoST execution that flight software was incorrectly writing to a register field that
controls the radio configuration. The cause of this issue was due to a flight software error
resulting in the wrong bitmask being utilized in the source code. The radio configuration
was not being set correctly. This issue would have gone unnoticed until much later in the
software development and testing lifecycle and probably would not have been detected
until hardware-in-the-loop testing occurred with an actual radio performing radio
frequency (RF) testing in a hardware laboratory.
6.3.4 Defect Identified 4: Safe Mode Needs More Functionality After Fatal Fault
During V&V testing of a mission utilizing a SoST, it was found that a flight software error
was present in the Safe Mode software configuration. Once identified, the Safe Mode
source code was re-worked so that if a Fatal Fault would occur and the spacecraft
transitioned to Safe Mode, then the identified issue would not occur.

7 Conclusions and Future Work Areas
7.1 Conclusions
This dissertation covers many aspects of software-only simulation, spacecraft, SmallSats,
and focuses on the design, development, and operation of Software-only Simulation Test
Beds (SoSTs). SoSTs require significant systems engineering knowledge that
encompasses spacecraft hardware, embedded software, attitude control, virtualization,
and modeling/simulation. The broad engineering knowledge required is a significant
challenge for successfully implementing a SoST and has required years of research and
development to get the established maturity witnessed today. This dissertation is the
culmination of years of advanced research, development, and engineering across many
NASA missions and several SmallSat missions.
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The Conclusion Statements below are meant to summarize this dissertation by
highlighting the major contributions and accomplishments to the field. The entire
SoST invention, including its processes and design, is unique and novel; however, the
conclusion statements focus on the SoST technical accomplishments critical to SoST
successful development.
7.1.1 Conclusion/Contribution Statement 1
SoSTs complemented hardware V&V test laboratories by providing more resources and
enabling fault injection testing. During the COVID-19 pandemic, hardware test
laboratories have been closed, and SoST usage has increased due to their ease of
deployment.
7.1.2 Conclusion/Contribution Statement 2
SoSTs have provided measurable assurance for both NASA and SmallSat missions,
resulting in several Severity 1 "Mission Ending" issues being identified and resolved.
7.1.3 Conclusion/Contribution Statement 3
SoSTs can be applied to SmallSats to increase their mission's assurance. SoSTs were
typically applied to large NASA missions, but their application to SmallSats is similar and
proven and assists with the entire SmallSat flight software development and test
lifecycles.
7.1.4 Conclusion/Contribution Statement 4
Time synchronization of modeled hardware components is critical and is accomplished
by utilizing the invented NOS Engine middleware. Synchronous operations allow for all
models to be paused simultaneously during any CPU transaction, allowing for powerful
V&V analysis.

7.2 Future Work Areas
This research has seen the birth and maturation of SoSTs for both large spacecraft
missions and SmallSat missions. While the SoST invention has had significant impacts
on the NASA IV&V’s processes and results, including the NASA agency in general, there
is additional future work that needs to be researched and implemented to push state of
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the art forward another leap. The following subsections describe the next leap in SoST
capabilities.
7.2.1 Hybrid SoST Architecture with Hardware-In-The-Loop Capabilities
The subject of this dissertation is Software-only Simulation Test Bed (SoST), with
emphasis on the “software-only” where hardware models are developed, and hardware
systems are abstracted so as to provide a software-only digital representation. While
there are many advantages to an SoST (most of which have been noted in this
dissertation), there are specific use-cases when a hybrid SoST and hardware-in the-loop
configuration is required. Over several years this author has been asked about such
configurations on occasion, and the answer is always related to timing design and
implementation between the software-only components and the hardware-in-the-loop
components. For example, the software-only components execute in a synchronous
virtual time, whereas the hardware-in-the-loop components execute in a real-world wallclock time context. A synchronization method must be provided between the two, which
can become extremely tricky, requiring significantly more research, design, and
implementation efforts.
The NOS3 Chapter 4 alludes to a hybrid hardware/software in the loop configuration but
does not dive into the detail. NOS3 provides the most straightforward path toward a
software/hardware hybrid configuration due mainly to NOS3 not always needing an
instruction set simulator. The usage of an instruction set simulator requires significant
development for timing synchronization. Without an instruction set simulator several
configuration options are possible and need to be investigated further.

These

configurations are described briefly below.
The hybrid hardware/software architecture could demonstrate a closed-loop system
encompassing a flight software controller commanding a simulated actuator and receiving
feedback from the affected simulated sensors.
•

Possible Configuration 1: Linux Flight Software and Real Interfaces/Instruments

This hybrid configuration is ideal for the flight software development related to interacting
with hardware. Since access to the on-board flight computer is limited, the ability to
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validate software design and implementation using a portable Linux flight software is
advantageous. This would allow teams to develop software in parallel without
coordinating access to the flight computer.
One possible configuration involves connecting the flight software on Linux to the real
instruments using IO adapter cards, as shown in Figure 62. In this configuration, a mix of
simulated instruments and real instruments can be combined to provide a complete
simulation. The simulated instruments interface with the flight software using NOS Engine
is done in the typical SoST. A time synchronization (TimeSync) application within the flight
software receives a command from the scheduler app at 1 Hz. When the TimeSync app
receives the command, it sends out a time value using NOS Engine Time Distribution,
which is bridged through the STF-1 HWLIB and LIBA3200NOS libraries. This will enable
all software simulations to run at pace with the flight software, which takes care of the
time synchronization.
To interface the real instruments, IO hardware adapters are needed to bridge the
interfaces to the computer (likely over USB). Additional NOS Engine client side
functionality will need to be developed to enable the various IO adapters to be used.
There will be no time synchronization between the flight software and the real
instruments; each will run open-loop at normal speed. This is not considered a problem,
as the goal of testing in this configuration is to verify the hardware interface code, not the
‘day-in-the-life’ operational logic.
This design provides flexibility. By using NOS Engine as a common interface in either
situation, interception capabilities are available and compile-time flags can be kept
minimal. If no software simulations are present, the TimeSync application can be removed
from the CFE startup script and the command message removed from the scheduler
table, disabling the app without the need to recompile the entire FSW.
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Figure 62. Linux FSW with Real Instruments

Another possible configuration is shown in Figure 63. This is similar to the previous figure,
except that the GPS hardware has been replaced with a second UART adapter, which
connects to another computer hosting the GPS Sim. This would allow testing of the
performance of the hardware interfaces without the real instrument. This would also
provide the ability to synchronize the GPS Sim data with the flight software clock. This
setup can be used to identify any potential issues related to the timing or performance of
the IO busses. The caveat is that the interfaces are not identical to the actual flight
computer, so the accuracy of the results may be questionable.
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Figure 63. Linux FSW with Real Instruments Variation

•

Possible Configuration #2: Target FSW and Simulated Instruments

This hybrid simulation is suited for verifying the flight software in its unmodified, flightready configuration. The use case for this simulation is to ensure the FSW responds to
different stimuli as expected. Figure 64 shows the configuration.
In this setup, the unmodified flight software runs on the NanoMind flight computer – the
LIBA3200 library is now used, providing access to the built-in IO interfaces. The
instrument simulations connect to the NanoMind board using IO cards. NOS Engine, with
the additional IO-card functionality, is used as the software interface for the simulations.
This retains the interception capability and reduces code refactoring within the Sim
applications. The devices (flight computer and instrument simulations) can run open loop
based on their own internal clocks.
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Figure 64. NanoMind FSW with Simulated Instruments

7.2.2 Better Integration of SoST Development with Mission Development Lifecycles
Developing a V&V environment (e.g., hardware test beds, SoSTs, etc.) is currently
considered

a

separate

and

later

activity

from

designing

the

spacecraft’s

computing/avionics platform and hardware architecture. Typically, V&V environments
consist of additional hardware, system simulations, and possibly cross-compiling the flight
software for a different hardware target. These activities add additional time and cost to
the project and may not be completely representative of the spacecraft’s actual
architecture, thus breaking the test-as-you-fly mantra. For example, it is cost prohibitive
for V&V teams to utilize actual flight versions of the RAD750s; instead, they often rely on
the much cheaper Freescale MPC750 which is a similar PowerPC, but not the same flight
architecture as the RAD750. This end-of-life CPU provides a method to test software,
but cross-compiling is often necessary because the RAD750s and MPC750s are not
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identical hardware platforms. It would be extremely beneficial to the spacecraft project if
both the developer, testing, and integration teams would utilize the same hardware and
SoSTs so that the “test-as-you-fly” and “fly-as-you-test” principles could be upheld.
7.2.3 Spacecraft Computing Architecture with Accompanying SoST
The goal of this task is to identify the computing components that would facilitate an
architecture that would produce both a hardware design as well as an SoST without any
additional effort. This is a novel concept in that the flight hardware architecture is driven
by both mission requirements and SoST V&V environment requirements. Having these
concepts drive the hardware flight architecture, and flight computer hardware would
significantly improve the V&V and mission assurance capabilities.
For example, an investigation into this advanced topic area could begin with
experimentations on a Xilinx Virtex-5 FPGA development kit. The Virtex-5 is a radiationtolerant FPGA that supports significant software-core configuration.

This particular

development kit is popular for implementing the LEON processor SPARC v8 architecture
[61], which is an architecture also popular for SoSTs. Research needs performed on
specific spacecraft missions that utilize the LEON processor so that current practices can
be well understood. The VHDL that is used to program the FPGAs can be fully simulated
in an SoST allowing for a “digital spacecraft twin” to be quickly evaluated [62] and
executed.
7.2.4 SoSTs for CyberSecurity Applications
The demand from SoSTs during the past two years has increased significantly due to
cybersecurity and penetration testing needs for spacecraft. Organizations, both within and
outside NASA, have realized that having access to high-fidelity spacecraft simulators and
their incredibly realistic data can be utilized for numerous purposes.
The spacecraft cybersecurity topics are related to 1) Command & Telemetry Verification,
2) Protocol Configuration Verification, 3) Vulnerability Testing, and 4) Incident Response
Training. More work needs to be performed to further define cybersecurity requirements
and implement “hooks” into the SoST to further develop cybersecurity capabilities.
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